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Markets increase social welfare by matching willing buyers and sellers. It is important to 
understand whether markets are fulfilling their societal purpose and are operating efficiently. The 
prevalence of spatial arbitrage in markets is an important indicator of market efficiency. The two 
essays in my dissertation study spatial arbitrage and the behaviors of arbitrageurs  
Electronic commerce can improve market efficiency by helping buyers and sellers find 
and transact with each other across geographic distance. In the first essay, we study the effect of 
two distinct forms of electronic commerce on market efficiency, which we measure via the 
prevalence of spatial arbitrage. Spatial arbitrage is a more precise measure than price dispersion, 
which is typically used, because it accounts for the transaction costs of trading across distance 
and for unobserved product heterogeneity. Studying two forms of electronic commerce allows us 
to examine how the theoretical mechanisms of expanded reach and transaction immediacy affect 
market efficiency. We find that electronic commerce reduces the number of arbitrage 
opportunities but improves arbitrageur’s ability to identify and exploit those that remain. Overall, 
our results provide a novel and nuanced understanding of how electronic commerce improves 
market efficiency. Studying arbitrageur strategies will help us understand how arbitrageur 
behaviors impact markets by increasing/reducing spatial arbitrage. 
 In the second essay, we study specialization strategies of arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs 
specialize on asset type and sourcing locations. We investigate the role of specialization and find 
that specialization affects both arbitrage profits and arbitrage intensity. Subsequently, we find 
that specialization strategies evolve over time and different groups of arbitrageurs adapt 




the predictions of the adaptive markets hypothesis and help us understand antecedents such as 





CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Markets increase social welfare by matching buyers and sellers and enabling trade between 
buyers and sellers. However, impediments to trade caused by factors such as difficulties in 
transporting goods and/or government regulations inhibit free trade across geographic distances. 
Arbitrageurs exploit such opportunities in markets by purchasing goods at locations where the 
good is priced low; they then transport the good to another location to sell it at a higher price. 
This is known as spatial arbitrage. The law of one price and the condition for market efficiency is 
that prices of the same good across locations should be the same. (Transaction costs can vary, 
i.e., the cost of transporting the good between two locations and other fees associated with the 
good.) Spatial arbitrage and arbitrageurs are fundamental to market efficiency since arbitrageurs 
enable the matching of supply and demand across locations and, therefore, enable equilibration 
across geographic distances (Barrett 2008, Takayama and Judge 1964).  
One of the most enduring streams of literature in Information Systems and Economics is the 
study of the effect of electronic commerce on markets and market efficiency. Several studies 
have shown how electronic commerce plays a major role in reducing price dispersion, thereby 
improving market efficiency (Bakos 1998, Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). In most studies 
regarding market efficiency, scholars have used price dispersion as a measure of market 
efficiency. A key factor that has prevented scholars from studying spatial arbitrage in markets 
has been that of data limitations.  
The first essay in this dissertation studies the effect of electronic commerce on market 




locations and goods. We identify the effect of two different modes of electronic commerce 
(webcast and standalone electronic market) on spatial arbitrage and, by extension, market 
efficiency. We study differences in the effects of two electronic-trading channels based on 
channel features—namely, transaction immediacy and channel reach. Our results indicate that 
although electronic commerce reduces spatial arbitrage (and improves market efficiency), this 
effect is nuanced because of the variations in channel features between the two electronic 
commerce channels. Our results indicate that the webcast channel reduces the number of vehicles 
that are arbitraged, and the standalone electronic market channel increases the likelihood of 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities. Our findings indicate a nuanced effect, these two electronic 
channels – while reducing the overall opportunities in the markets also improve the ability of 
arbitrageurs to exploit market opportunities that remain. 
In the third chapter of this dissertation, we study arbitrageur behavior with respect to the 
arbitrageur’s specialization strategy. Recent advances in behavioral finance, which originated in 
the “Limits of Arbitrage,” have attempted to show that arbitrage cannot entirely eliminate market 
inefficiencies because of limitations faced by arbitrageurs (Barberis and Thaler 2003, 
Mullainathan and Thaler 2000, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Risk-avoidance, capital limitations, 
cognitive limitations, bounded rationality, and arbitrageur specialization are some factors 
identified in prior literature as factors limiting the arbitrageur.  
A more recent stream of research called the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis provides a 
framework to explain predictions of behavioral finance (Lo 2004). This theoretical framework 
uses theories of evolution to explain behaviors of arbitrageurs (and other traders) in markets. The 




of environmental factors and behavioral biases exhibited by arbitrageurs. One of the key 
predictions of this stream of research is that groups of traders will adapt their behaviors to 
environmental changes in specific ways and will evolve similarly. Based on the predictions of 
the limits of arbitrage and adaptive markets hypothesis, we empirically examine specialization 
strategies of arbitrageurs. Firstly, we test the theoretical predictions regarding arbitrageur 
specialization and the effects of specialization on arbitrage profits. Then, we analyze how 
different groups of arbitrageurs evolve behaviorally in markets with respect to their 
specialization strategies. Finally, we conclude by analyzing the antecedents that affect the 
evolution of arbitrageur strategies. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, Spatial Arbitrage, Electronic 
Commerce, and Market Efficiency, we study the effect of electronic commerce on market 
efficiency as indicated by spatial arbitrage. In Chapter 3, Spatial Arbitrage and Arbitrageur 
Specialization Strategies, we examine the specialization strategies of arbitrageurs with respect to 
their choice of asset and sourcing locations. Finally, in Chapter 4 we conclude the dissertation by 
summarizing the key findings of Chapters 2 and 3.  
Keywords: electronic commerce, spatial arbitrage, market efficiency, quasi-natural experiment, limits of 
arbitrage, discrete choice models, mixed logit, coarsened exact matching, behavioral bias, Gini 










Markets can increase social welfare by matching willing buyers and sellers (McMillan 2002). 
However, geography can limit how efficiently markets match buyers and sellers, because it may be 
difficult for them to find and trade with each other across distance, even if such a trade would be optimal 
for both parties. Electronic commerce should facilitate trading across geographic distance in at least two 
ways: a) by improving the visibility of buyers and sellers in different geographic locations, and b) by 
eliminating the need for collocation between buyers and sellers (Bakos 1991). As such, studying the 
effect of electronic commerce on market efficiency is an important stream in information systems 
research and as well as in economics (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Ghose and Yao 2011, Jensen 
2007). We contribute to this stream by posing the following research question: How does electronic 
commerce affect market efficiency, as measured by the prevalence of spatial arbitrage?  
Addressing this question allows us to make the following contributions. First, scholars typically use 
price dispersion to measure market efficiency. In contrast, we use the prevalence of spatial arbitrage, 
which is a more precise measure. Following Coleman (2009), we define spatial arbitrage as the purchase 
and subsequent resale of the same product in different geographic locations to exploit a price 
discrepancy.1 If buyers and sellers do not match efficiently across locations, then this creates spatial 
arbitrage opportunities in which a third party – an arbitrageur – purchases products from sellers in 
                                                          
1 To limit definitional confusion, we do not consider instances in which buyers (sellers) eschew buying 
(selling) at one location in favor of another because of price differences to be “arbitrage”, even though 
some authors use the term that way (e.g., Jensen 2007). This is because arbitrage, as we define it and as is 




locations where prices are low and resells them to buyers in locations where prices are high. Spatial 
arbitrage will occur as long as the transaction costs associated with moving products between locations 
are lower than the price difference between locations, becoming more prevalent as the gap between the 
transaction costs and the price difference widens. This measure has several advantages over price 
dispersion, including inherently accounting for transaction costs and for unobserved product 
heterogeneity. To illustrate the first advantage, consider a perfectly efficient market, i.e., one in which 
buyers and sellers match optimally, regardless of geographic location. According to the law of one price, 
this market might have substantial price dispersion, because prices in an efficient market can vary up to 
the transaction costs of moving products between locations (Persson 2008). But there would be no spatial 
arbitrage in this market; indeed, “no arbitrage” is a classic condition for market efficiency (Barrett 2008; 
Takayama and Judge 1971). Thus, a researcher using price dispersion to measure market efficiency might 
incorrectly conclude that this market was inefficient. A researcher using the prevalence of spatial 
arbitrage to measure market efficiency (and not finding any) would not make this mistake. Our use of this 
new measure is important because improving measurement is fundamental to scientific advancement. 
Second, we examine why electronic commerce affects market efficiency by examining two theoretical 
factors that distinguish electronic commerce from traditional commerce: reach and transaction 
immediacy. Reach allows traders to find and transact with each other across geographic distance, and 
transaction immediacy allows them to conduct transactions immediately, at any time. Empirically, we 
study two distinct forms of electronic commerce, both of which provide expanded reach but only one of 
which provides transaction immediacy. This distinction allows us to better understand the mechanisms 
behind the effect of electronic commerce. It also allows us to contribute to the growing body of research 
that recognizes that not all forms of electronic commerce are the same (Ghose et al. 2013).  
Third, we contribute to the empirical literature on arbitrage. Arbitrage is a central mechanism in many 




theories, arbitrageurs are the critical agents who identify and exploit market inefficiencies as they arise, 
thereby restoring efficiency by rebalancing supply and demand (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Despite 
arbitrage’s central place within theory, there is little empirical evidence about how arbitrageurs behave. 
We contribute to this literature by studying how arbitrageurs choose where to source products for 
arbitrage, including how this is affected by electronic commerce. 
Despite its advantages, the prevalence of spatial arbitrage has rarely been used to measure market 
efficiency. This is because spatial arbitrage transactions are difficult to observe: a researcher must be able 
to observe a trader i who purchases an item at “source” location k and then quickly resells the same item 
at a different “destination” location l. This requires unique (and consistent) trader, location, and item-level 
identifiers. We overcome this by studying spatial arbitrage in the context of the wholesale used vehicle 
market, where we track the trading history of each vehicle based on its unique Vehicle Identification 
Number (VIN). Our data also contain unique and consistent identifiers for the traders and market 
locations. Another advantage of this context is that this market has implemented two distinct electronic 
channels: a webcast channel that allows electronic access to the traditional physical market and a 
standalone electronic market. Both channels provide expanded reach, but only the standalone electronic 
market provides transaction immediacy. These channels accounted for an increasing number of 
transactions over our sample period (2003 to 2010).  
Theoretically, the expanded reach provided by both channels should help “regular” buyers purchase 
directly from sellers in remote locations, thereby disintermediating the arbitrageurs and reducing arbitrage 
opportunities. But it should also help arbitrageurs find and exploit previously hidden opportunities. The 
transaction immediacy provided by the standalone electronic market should also help arbitrageurs identify 
and exploit arbitrage opportunities before they dissipate. This suggests a nuanced effect in which 
electronic commerce eliminates many arbitrage opportunities but improves arbitrageurs’ ability to 




arbitrage transactions (i.e., exploited opportunities) depends on whether the channel increases the 
efficiency with which arbitrageurs exploit opportunities more than it reduces the number of opportunities. 
This is not clear a priori and warrants empirical testing. 
Empirically, we find support for the nuanced effect: the number of arbitrage opportunities decreased 
as electronic commerce became more widely used, but the percentage of arbitrage opportunities that were 
exploited increased. We examined this further by leveraging the phased implementation of the webcast 
channel across the market to conduct a quasi-natural experiment to examine its effect. We used a similar 
matching estimation to examine the effect of the standalone electronic market. The webcast channel has a 
negative effect on spatial arbitrage, whereas the standalone electronic market has a positive effect. As 
theorized, both channels increased geographic purchasing reach. Also, buyers leveraged the transaction 
immediacy of the standalone electronic market to exploit arbitrage opportunities by quickly identifying 
and purchasing undervalued vehicles. (They did not do this via the webcast channel, because it does not 
provide transaction immediacy.) We conclude that the “opportunity exploitation” effect outpaced the 
“opportunity reduction” effect in the standalone electronic market (yielding the positive overall effect) but 
not in the webcast channel (yielding the negative overall effect). Because the webcast channel was more 
widely used during the sample period, the “opportunity reduction” effect outpaced the “opportunity 
exploitation” effect overall, resulting in an overall decline in the number of arbitrage transactions (i.e., 
exploited opportunities). Consistent with the negative effect of the webcast channel on arbitrage, we find 
that arbitrageurs’ preference of facility from which to source vehicles declined with the degree to which 
the webcast channel had been deployed. In general, we find that arbitrageurs prefer to source vehicles at 
locations that are difficult for other traders to access (both physically and electronically), likely because 
these locations are more isolated from market-wide price trends. 
Overall, our results provide a fuller and more nuanced picture of the way in which electronic 




analysis suggests that electronic commerce can improve efficiency in two ways. The first way is that 
electronic commerce can help buyers and sellers trade with each other across geographic locations, 
thereby providing better supply/demand balance. This is consistent with prior research (e.g., Aker 2010, 
Jensen 2007). The second way – which is more subtle and has not been empirically shown to our 
knowledge – is that electronic commerce can help arbitrageurs better exploit any remaining 
supply/demand imbalances, the very act of which helps return a market to efficiency when it strays.  
In §2, we review the prior literature and describe the differentiators of our study. In §3, we present 
our theory and hypotheses. In §4, we describe our empirical setting. In §5, we present our analyses and 
results. In §6, we conclude with a summary of the paper’s findings, contributions, and limitations. 
2.2 Literature review 
 
Our research contributes to two research streams: a) the literature on market efficiency, including how 
it is affected by electronic commerce, and b) the literature on spatial arbitrage and arbitrageur behavior.  
2.2.1 Research on market efficiency and electronic commerce 
 
Scholars have typically measured market efficiency by examining price dispersion (e.g., Chellappa et 
al. 2011, Ghose and Yao 2011). The intuition is that a high degree of price dispersion indicates that 
products are not being allocated efficiently, i.e., that supply is too high for the demand in some regions 
and too low in other regions. This will lead to low prices in the former regions and to high prices in the 
latter regions, creating price dispersion. Scholars have also measured market efficiency by analyzing the 
co-movement of prices at different locations over time, which is essentially an analysis of how price 
dispersion evolves longitudinally (Alexander and Wyeth 1994). The intuition for this measure is that 
prices in an efficient market can differ across locations up to the cost of transport between locations 
(Persson 2008, Takayama and Judge 1971), but this difference should be relatively constant over time. 




unchanged. If prices do not move together, then this might reflect excess supply or demand in certain 
locations at certain times, reflecting the market’s inefficiency at balancing supply and demand. 
To assess the effect of electronic commerce on market efficiency, scholars have examined whether 
price dispersion is lower online than offline (Brown and Goolsbee 2002, Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). A 
common motivation for these studies is that because transaction costs are lower online than offline (as is 
typically assumed), supply and demand will be more efficiently distributed online, resulting in lower price 
dispersion online. Empirical support for this is mixed (Baye et al. 2006). Another approach scholars have 
used is to examine whether price dispersion in a market declines as electronic commerce is adopted. 
Studies using this approach have shown that electronic commerce has led to reduced price dispersion 
across locations (e.g., Aker 2010, Overby and Forman 2015, Parker et al. 2013).  
We extend this literature in two ways. First, we use the prevalence of spatial arbitrage, rather than 
price dispersion, to measure efficiency. Second, we examine two distinct forms of electronic commerce. 
2.2.1.1 Measuring efficiency via the prevalence of spatial arbitrage rather than via price dispersion: 
Despite its widespread use, price dispersion has two key limitations as a measure of efficiency (Badiane 
and Shively 1998, Barrett 2008). First, a “baseline” level of price dispersion may exist in a perfectly 
efficient market, with this baseline equal to the transaction costs of moving products between locations 
(Takayama and Judge 1971). Without knowledge of these costs, it is difficult to determine what level of 
price dispersion represents the baseline level vs. what level represents inefficiency in matching buyers 
and sellers. Prior research that has relied on price dispersion to measure efficiency has often worked 
around this issue by studying price dispersion on a relative basis. E.g., if the level of price dispersion in a 




approach makes the (potentially erroneous) assumption that the baseline does not also decline.2 Second, 
price dispersion will be an inaccurate measure of market efficiency if products whose prices are being 
compared are not comparable due to unobserved factors such as differences in quality. Although this is 
not a concern for perfectly homogeneous products, it is a concern for any product whose attributes may 
vary from unit-to-unit (e.g., agricultural crops, automobiles, crude oil, metals, etc.)  
To illustrate the first limitation, consider (hypothetically) that the price of a barrel of crude oil is $45 
in the United States (“US”) and $55 in the United Kingdom (“UK”). On one hand, this $10 price 
dispersion might reflect an inefficient imbalance in supply and demand (e.g., too many buyers in the UK). 
On the other hand, supply and demand might be perfectly balanced, with the $10 dispersion resulting 
from different tax/tariff regimes and/or non-zero transport costs between the US and the UK. In the first 
case, buyers in the UK (sellers in the US) would be better off shifting their demand (supply) to the US 
(UK) where they could exploit the inefficiency for profit. In the second case, they would not, because 
there is no inefficiency to exploit. To illustrate the second limitation, consider that crude oil in the UK 
might be of higher quality than that in the US. In this case, the $10 price dispersion would reflect this 
quality difference, not inefficiency in balancing supply and demand.  
Using the prevalence of spatial arbitrage as the measure of market efficiency addresses these two 
limitations. First, the arbitrage measure inherently accounts for the transaction costs of moving products 
between locations. To elaborate, consider that although it is difficult for researchers to assess whether a 
given level of price dispersion exceeds the transaction costs of moving products between locations, it is 
far less difficult for arbitrageurs. This is because arbitrageurs are market specialists who are keenly aware 
                                                          
2 For example, assume that price dispersion between two locations over a four-year period is 20, 19, 18, 
and 17. This decline could be due to improved efficiency. But it could also be due to an annual 1-unit 
reduction in the costs of transporting products between locations – with efficiency remaining unchanged. 




of price disparities and the transaction costs associated with exploiting them (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Arbitrageurs consider the transaction costs when determining whether to engage in arbitrage. If the 
transaction costs are lower than the price disparities, then arbitrage will occur, becoming more prevalent 
as the gap between the transaction costs and the price disparities widens, i.e., as the market becomes more 
inefficient. If the transaction costs are higher than the price disparities, then arbitrage will not occur. 
Essentially, using the prevalence of spatial arbitrage to measure efficiency eliminates the burden from the 
researcher of trying to estimate whether a given level of price dispersion represents inefficiency. Instead, 
this question is answered (directly) by the arbitrageurs. Second, the arbitrage measure is immune to 
potential quality differences across products, because the same product is traded in both locations (unless 
the product is altered during transport). 
To illustrate these advantages, we return to the crude oil example. If we observe arbitrage activity in 
which arbitrageurs purchase in the US for $45 per barrel and resell in the UK for $55, then we can safely 
assume that the transaction costs are less than $10 per barrel and that the market is inefficient. Also, 
because the same oil is being transacted in both locations, we can eliminate the possibility that the $10 
price dispersion is due to quality differences. On the other hand, if we do not observe arbitrage activity, 
then the $10 price dispersion is more likely to reflect non-zero transaction costs or differences in quality 
than inefficiency. Table 1.1 summarizes the advantages of measuring market efficiency via the prevalence 
of spatial arbitrage instead of price dispersion. 
2.2.1.2 Examining two distinct forms of electronic commerce: A limitation of research on electronic 
commerce and market efficiency is that it tends to implicitly assume that all forms of electronic 
commerce are the same. Prior studies have either examined a single form of electronic commerce and 
used that to draw conclusions about electronic commerce in general (e.g., Jensen, 2007) or studied 
electronic commerce in general terms without differentiating between different types of electronic 




effects of two distinct forms of electronic commerce: a webcast channel that permits electronic access to 
the traditional physical market and a standalone electronic market. This helps us examine the mechanisms 
responsible for the effect of electronic commerce. To elaborate, different forms of electronic commerce 
have different features. Assume that form #1 of electronic commerce has feature A and no effect on 
market efficiency, while form #2 has features A and B and a positive effect on market efficiency. This 
would suggest that feature B (and not feature A) is the reason for the effect. Such a conclusion would not 
be possible if only one of these two forms of electronic commerce were examined. Our analysis of 
multiple forms of electronic commerce also contributes to the growing literature that recognizes that 
different types of electronic commerce (e.g., PC vs. phone-based) may have different effects (e.g., Ghose 
et al. 2013). Table .12 summarizes how our research is distinct from prior research on the effect of 
electronic commerce on market efficiency. 
Table 2.1: Issues with measuring market efficiency via price dispersion and how those are remedied by 
using the prevalence of spatial arbitrage as the measure. 
 
 Measure of Market Efficiency 
 Price Dispersion Prevalence of Spatial Arbitrage 
Issue #1: Transaction 
costs of trading 
across locations 
Does not account for these costs, making 
it difficult to tell if a given level of price 
dispersion represents inefficiency or not. 
Accounts for these costs automatically 
because arbitrageurs consider them when 
determining whether to engage in arbitrage. 
Issue #2: Product 
quality differences 
between locations 
Only accounted for if the researcher 
compares homogeneous products or 
adjusts for product quality differences. 
Accounts for this automatically because the 
same product is traded at both locations. 
 
Table 2.2: Categorization of research on the effect of electronic commerce on market efficiency, including 
differentiators of the present study. 
 
  Measure of Market Efficiency 
  Price Dispersion Prevalence of Spatial Arbitrage 
Analysis of different 
forms of electronic 
commerce? 
Yes  Present study 
No Aker (2010), Brown and Goolsbee (2002), 
Chellappa et al. (2011), Jensen (2007), etc. 





2.2.2 Research on spatial arbitrage and arbitrageur behavior 
 
Another contribution of our study is that we document new empirical findings about spatial arbitrage 
and arbitrageur behavior. This is important because despite arbitrage’s central role in theory such as the 
law of one price and the efficient markets hypothesis, it is difficult to observe. As a result, much of what 
we believe about arbitrage is based on maintained assumptions that have not been subjected to empirical 
testing. Empirical analysis of spatial arbitrage is rare for two main reasons. First, because spatial arbitrage 
happens relatively infrequently and constitutes a small fraction of a market’s trade volume, empirical 
analysis of spatial arbitrage requires large datasets. Second, observation of spatial arbitrage requires 
unique (and consistent) identifiers for individual products, traders, and locations so that the trading 
history of products can be tracked. Because these data are often unavailable, scholars have used price 
dispersion (as noted above) to infer the presence of spatial arbitrage opportunities. A drawback to this 
approach is that it tells us very little about how arbitrageurs behave. We help address this situation and 
contribute to the research on arbitrage by studying how arbitrageurs choose where to source products, 
including how electronic commerce affects this. 
There is one other study of which we are aware that examines spatial arbitrage at a transaction-level. 
Overby and Clarke (2012) used data from the wholesale used vehicle industry to analyze how sellers’ 
bounded rationality causes them to distribute some vehicles sub-optimally, thereby creating opportunities 
to spatially arbitrage those vehicles. We depart from their analysis in several ways. First, we contribute 
novel findings about how arbitrageurs behave by examining where they choose to source products, which 
– despite the centrality of arbitrage to foundational economic theory – has not been previously examined 
to our knowledge. Second, we analyze the longitudinal change in both the number of arbitrage 
opportunities and the number of arbitrage transactions (i.e., the number of exploited opportunities); 
Overby and Clarke analyzed only the latter. This allows us to examine how electronic commerce affects 




correlation between webcast channel use and spatial arbitrage. We corroborate this negative relationship 
by conducting a quasi-natural experiment, which is a stronger identification strategy than that used by 
Overby and Clarke, thereby improving our ability to attribute causality to the relationship. Fourth, we 
analyze how both the webcast channel and the standalone electronic market affect spatial arbitrage. The 
standalone electronic market was ignored by Overby and Clarke, who – as in the studies mentioned above 
– studied only a single form of electronic trading. We find that the standalone electronic market has a 
positive effect on spatial arbitrage. Fifth, our analysis of multiple types of electronic commerce allows us 
to explore the mechanisms by which electronic commerce affects spatial arbitrage. This allows us to 
examine not only whether electronic commerce affects spatial arbitrage activity but also why.  
2.3 Theory and hypotheses 
 
2.3.1 Effect of electronic commerce on spatial arbitrage 
 
To consider the theoretical effect of electronic commerce on spatial arbitrage, it is useful to consider 
the features that distinguish electronic commerce from traditional commerce. We focus on two features 
for our analysis: a) reach, which is a spatial feature, and b) transaction immediacy, which is a temporal 
feature. First, we define reach as the ability for traders to find and transact with each other across 
geographic distance. Electronic commerce expands reach by lowering traders’ search costs, such that they 
can more easily find and consummate trading opportunities with partners in remote locations. Second, 
electronic commerce typically provides transaction immediacy, which we define as the ability to conduct 
a transaction immediately, at any time (e.g., when physical stores are closed, without having to wait in 
line, etc.)3 (Here, we are referring to the immediacy of the transaction itself, not necessarily to the 
                                                          
3 We include the word “typically” because it is possible for an electronic commerce system to only allow 





immediacy of providing/receiving the product exchanged in the transaction.) 
We next consider how these features of electronic commerce might affect spatial arbitrage. Spatial 
arbitrageurs are middlemen who purchase from a seller in location k and then resell to a buyer in location 
l. The reach provided by electronic commerce should help buyers and sellers in different locations find 
and transact with each other directly, thereby disintermediating the arbitrageur “middleman”. This is 
consistent with recent research that shows that buyers use electronic commerce to shift demand from 
nearby sellers whose prices are high to more remotely located sellers whose prices are lower (Overby and 
Forman 2015). On the other hand, arbitrageurs can benefit from the reach of electronic commerce just as 
“regular” buyers and sellers can. For example, the reach provided by electronic commerce might help 
arbitrageurs identify locations across which supply and demand are imbalanced, thereby helping them 
identify and exploit previously hidden arbitrage opportunities. This suggests that electronic commerce 
will have a nuanced effect; it should reduce the number of arbitrage opportunities while simultaneously 
improving arbitrageurs’ ability to identify and exploit the opportunities that remain. In other words, 
increasing use of electronic commerce should lead to a decrease in the number of arbitrage opportunities 
but to an increase in the percentage of arbitrage opportunities that are exploited. 
The transaction immediacy of electronic commerce should also affect spatial arbitrage. Arbitrageurs 
are continuously looking for opportunities in which products in location k are priced below their value in 
location l. These opportunities are fluid and do not persist indefinitely, because they depend on dynamic 
supply/demand conditions in both locations. Thus, if an arbitrageur identifies a potential arbitrage 
opportunity between locations k and l, it is important for him to purchase the product from location k 
before conditions change. The reach provided by electronic commerce will help arbitrageurs find these 
opportunities, and the transaction immediacy of electronic commerce will allow arbitrageurs to purchase 
the products before their prices change or they are purchased by a “regular” buyer. Thus, the transaction 




“Regular” buyers could also leverage the transaction immediacy of electronic commerce to purchase 
undervalued products, which would take opportunities away from the arbitrageurs. However, we expect 
arbitrageurs to take fuller advantage of transaction immediacy to purchase undervalued products. This is 
because there are many instances in which a product will appear undervalued to an arbitrageur but not to a 
regular buyer. To see this, consider that a regular buyer is only interested in whether a product in a remote 
location is undervalued relative to his location, i.e., he goes online to buy more cheaply than he can buy 
locally. By contrast, arbitrageurs are interested in whether a product in any location is undervalued 
relative to any other location. Figure 2.1 provides an illustration. Also, research in behavioral economics 
suggests that arbitrageurs will identify and seize arbitrage opportunities more quickly than will regular 
buyers, because the former have the expertise and time to monitor market conditions more closely (Peng 
and Xiong 2006, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The logic above suggests the following hypotheses. 
 
 
The figure illustrates (hypothetically) a regular buyer (in white) and an 
arbitrageur (in gray), both located in New Mexico. The (hypothetical) average 
price for a 2012 Honda Accord is shown for different locations. The $10,000 
vehicles in Oklahoma and Texas will not appear undervalued to the regular 
buyer, who will compare them to vehicles in New Mexico. By contrast, they 
will appear undervalued to the arbitrageur, who will compare them to 
vehicles not only in New Mexico but also in Louisiana and Mississippi.  
 
Figure 2.1: Illustration of why more products will appear undervalued to arbitrageurs than to regular 
buyers. 
 
H1a, H1b: Increasing use of electronic commerce is: a) negatively associated with the number of 
arbitrage opportunities, but b) positively associated with the percentage of arbitrage opportunities that 
are exploited. 
Whether electronic commerce leads to an increase or decrease in the number of arbitrage 











arbitrage) depends on whether the increased efficiency with which arbitrageurs exploit opportunities (i.e., 
the “opportunity exploitation” effect) outpaces the reduction in opportunities (i.e., the “opportunity 
reduction” effect). This should depend on the degree to which the form of electronic commerce supports 
expanded reach and transaction immediacy. In particular, assuming the degree of expanded reach is held 
constant, a form of electronic commerce that provides transaction immediacy is more likely to foster 
arbitrage activity (or at least inhibit it less) than a form that does not.  
H2: Different forms of electronic commerce will have different effects on the prevalence of spatial 
arbitrage, with forms that support transaction immediacy having a more positive effect. 
2.3.2 Factors that affect arbitrageur behavior of where to source products for later arbitrage 
 
Several factors may influence the locations from which arbitrageurs choose to source products. First, 
arbitrageurs should prefer source locations where they expect to find a high percentage of inexpensive 
products that they can profitably arbitrage. Arbitrageurs should also prefer source locations at which 
prices for the products being offered vary widely across locations. This is because the more product prices 
vary across locations, the larger the potential arbitrage profits. 
H3a, H3b: Arbitrageurs will prefer source locations at which: a) a high percentage of products sell 
for below their market value, and b) prices for the products being sold vary widely across locations. 
Arbitrageurs should seek to limit the cost of sourcing vehicles (thereby increasing their arbitrage 
profit) by purchasing at locations close to them. However, if two locations are equidistant, an arbitrageur 
should prefer the location that is more difficult for other buyers/sellers to access, i.e., that is more isolated 
from the rest of the market. To explain, consider a location that is easily accessible to buyers/sellers. If 
prices at such a location become artificially low (high), then buyers (sellers) can easily shift demand 
(supply) there, thereby rebalancing supply and demand and eliminating would-be arbitrage opportunities. 




equilibrate to the market average, making the location an attractive source location. 
 H4a, H4b: Arbitrageurs will prefer source locations that are: a) nearby, but b) relatively difficult for 
other traders to access. 
2.4 Empirical context 
 
The empirical context for our study is the U.S. wholesale used vehicle market. Buyers in this market 
are used vehicle dealers. Most use the market as a source of inventory for their retail lots, while a small 
minority use the market to source vehicles for arbitrage within the wholesale market. The former (whom 
we will refer to as “buyers” or “regular buyers”) try to make money from the difference between vehicles’ 
retail and wholesale prices. The latter (whom we will refer to as “arbitrageurs”) try to make money by 
exploiting inefficiencies within the wholesale market. Sellers are of two types: a) used vehicle dealers, 
and b) institutional sellers such as rental car firms. The former use the market either to sell vehicles that 
they do not sell retail or (much less commonly) to sell vehicles that they are arbitraging within the 
wholesale market. Institutional sellers use the market to sell vehicles retired from their fleets. Data were 
provided by an intermediary in the market that facilitates trades between buyers and sellers. The 
intermediary operates over 70 physical market facilities across the U.S. as well as the webcast channel 
and standalone electronic market described below. The data consist of 40,657,724 successful transactions 
facilitated by the intermediary from 2003 to 2010. Variables are described in Table 2.3. 
Traditionally, the U.S. wholesale used vehicle market has functioned as a physical market in which 
buyers, sellers, and vehicles are collocated at market facilities. Each facility has a large parking lot for 
vehicle storage and a warehouse-type building equipped with multiple lanes, which are essentially one-
way streets. Transactions occur as follows. Vehicles are driven down a lane – one at a time – where 
buyers interested in that vehicle will have gathered. An auctioneer solicits bids for each vehicle and 




30-45 seconds, after which another vehicle is auctioned. It is common for vehicles to be auctioned in 
multiple lanes at the same facility concurrently. 
2.4.1 Two distinct forms of electronic commerce 
 
In the early 2000’s, the intermediary who operates these facilities began simulcasting via the Internet 
the physical auctions as they were occurring at the facilities. This allows buyers to experience the live 
audio and video of the auctions via an Internet browser, and it permits them to bid on vehicles in 
competition with the buyers who are physically collocated at the facility. As such, this “webcast” channel 
provides buyers with electronic access to the auctions occurring in the physical market. The webcast 
channel was implemented in phases. This is because implementing the channel required that camera, 
microphone, and other equipment be implemented in each lane at each facility. This means that we 
observe many instances in which highly similar vehicles were auctioned at the same facility on the same 
day, some in lanes that were equipped for webcast and some in lanes that were not. As discussed below, 
we leverage this in a quasi-natural experiment to assess the effect of the webcast channel on the 
probability that a purchased vehicle is later arbitraged. Figure 2.2 shows how the percentage of vehicles 
available via webcast increased as the channel was deployed.4 The intermediary also operates a 
standalone electronic market whose format is similar to that of eBay. In this market, sellers post listings 
of their vehicles, and buyers have the option to purchase them for a fixed “Buy Now” price or to bid for 
                                                          
4 We estimated the webcast implementation date for each lane/facility combination (i.e., lane 1 in Las 
Vegas, lane 2 in Las Vegas, etc.) as follows. The data denote whether a vehicle sold in the physical 
market was purchased by a buyer using the traditional physical channel or the webcast channel. For each 
lane/facility combination, we recorded the date of the first webcast purchase and used that as the webcast 
implementation date for that lane/facility. We considered all vehicles offered in that lane/facility from that 
date forward to be available via webcast. We used this to determine whether any given vehicle was 
available via webcast. Because there could be a lag between webcast implementation and the date of the 
first webcast purchase for a lane, we reran our analysis after adjusting the webcast implementation date 




them. Typically, a winning bidder exceeds the seller’s (hidden) reserve price. But sometimes the seller 
will sell to the high bidder before the reserve price has been met. It is important to note that sellers choose 
to offer a vehicle either: a) at a physical market facility, where the vehicle is available to buyers present at 
that facility and to buyers accessing that facility via webcast (if enabled in the vehicle’s lane), or b) in the 
standalone electronic market. Buyers can purchase a vehicle from: a) a physical market facility via the 
traditional physical channel, b) a physical market facility via the webcast channel (if enabled), or c) the 
standalone electronic market. 
 
Figure 2.2: Annual percentage of vehicles offered in the physical market that were offered in 
webcast enabled lanes 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the webcast channel and the standalone electronic market differ in 
their ability to provide expanded reach and transaction immediacy. Both forms of electronic commerce 
provide expanded reach: using either form, buyers can easily search for and purchase vehicles from 
remote locations without having to travel.5 However, due to their different designs, only the standalone 
electronic market provides transaction immediacy. This is because the webcast channel is an electronic 
access channel to auctions occurring in the physical market. As a result, the webcast channel can only be 
used to purchase vehicles during the 30-45 second window within which they are being auctioned at the 
                                                          
5 The channels provide expanded reach because they lower search costs. The webcast channel reduces 
search costs by letting buyers “look in” on and participate in auctions occurring across the country. This 
lowers buyers’ cost of searching for and acquiring vehicle and price information across facilities. The 











physical market facility. Also, a buyer can only purchase a vehicle in the webcast channel if he places the 
highest bid and has this bid accepted by the seller. This means that the webcast channel cannot be used by 
a buyer to purchase a vehicle immediately, at any time; i.e., there is no transaction immediacy. By 
contrast, most vehicle listings in the standalone electronic market include a posted “Buy Now” price. 
Buyers can click this button at any time to purchase the vehicle immediately. We leverage these 
differences in our analysis, including to test H2.  
Table 2.3: Description of variables. 
Variable Description Descriptive statistics 
Arbitraged 
Denotes whether a purchased vehicle was spatially arbitraged (=1) or 
not (=0). 
Mean: 0.0079 SD: 0.0885 
FacilityID The ID for the facility at which the vehicle was located. - 
FacilityZip The facility’s zip code. - 
LaneID The ID for the lane at the facility in which the vehicle was auctioned. - 
TraderID 
The ID for the trader. The same ID is used regardless of whether the 
trader is the buyer or seller in a transaction. 
- 
BuyerZip 
The buyer’s zip code. Could also be thought of as ArbitrageurZip 
when the buyer later arbitrages the vehicle. 
- 
BuyerDistance The distance in miles between BuyerZip and FacilityZip. Mean: 205; SD: 343 
SellerType 
Denotes the type of seller (institutional or dealer). 1=institutional; 
0=dealer. 
Mean: 0.57; SD: 0.50 
SellerPct 
Arbitraged 
The percentage of vehicles sold by the seller over the previous 28 
days that were arbitraged. If over previous 28 days the seller sold 0 
vehicles, we increased the number of days until the number sold was 
greater than 0. 
Mean: 0.006 SD: 0.023 
SaleDate The date the vehicle was sold. - 
VIN The vehicle’s unique Vehicle Identification Number. - 
VehicleYear The model year of the vehicle. Mean: 2006.6; SD: 2.43 
Make The make of the vehicle, e.g., Chevrolet, Toyota, etc. - 
Model The model of the vehicle, e.g., Tahoe, Camry, etc. - 





The vehicle’s market value as estimated by the intermediary that 
provided the data. 
Mean: 10589; SD: 8051 




Denotes whether a vehicle was offered in the standalone electronic 
market (=1) or the physical market (=0). 
Mean: 0.02; SD: 0.14 
Webcast 
Enabled 
Denotes whether a vehicle in the physical market was offered in a 
webcast enabled lane (=1) or not (=0). 
Mean: 0.76; SD: 0.44 
WebcastBuyer 
Denotes whether a vehicle offered in the physical market was 
purchased by a buyer using the webcast channel (=1) or the physical 
channel (=0). 
Mean: 0.09; SD: 0.28 
BuyFee The transaction fee paid by the buyer. Mean: 182.1; SD: 144.9 
SellFee The transaction fee paid by the seller. Mean: 134.5; SD: 184.6 
TransportFee 
The transport fee between the facility and the buyer’s location. Not 
available for all transactions; see the appendix. 
Mean: 160.8; SD: 161.8 
ListingDate The date a vehicle was listed on the standalone electronic market.a  - 
Transaction 
Type 
Denotes whether a vehicle was purchased in the standalone 
electronic market via the Buy Now mechanism or auction (either 
before or after the hidden reserve price is met).a 
Buy Now: 58%; Auction 
(after reserve met): 35%; 
Auction (before reserve 
met): 7% 
a Not available for all transactions; see §5.2.3. 
 
2.4.2 Identification of spatial arbitrage 
 
Following Overby and Clarke (2012), we identified instances of spatial arbitrage as follows. First, we 
identified what we refer to as “flips”. A “flip” is a pair of transactions for the same vehicle (identified by 
its unique VIN) in which the buyer in the first transaction is the seller in the second transaction (as 
identified by his unique TraderID). Flips occur when an arbitrageur is engaging in spatial arbitrage, but 
they may also occur for other reasons. For example, a dealer may flip a vehicle if he is unable to retail it 
and chooses to liquidate it in the wholesale market. Or, a dealer may flip a vehicle after making 
improvements to it (e.g. repairing dents, replacing tires). There are 2,749,524 flips in the sample. We 




flips, i.e., those in which the two transactions that comprise the flip occur at different facilities (as 
identified by the unique FacilityIDs). This is useful for delineation because a spatial arbitrage transaction 
must occur across different facilities (by definition), whereas flips attributable to other reasons are likely 
to be same-facility flips. For example, a dealer who is flipping a vehicle he changed/improved or failed to 
retail is likely to sell at the same facility from which he purchased in order to avoid the cost of 
transporting the vehicle to a different facility. Second, we only consider those flips completed within α 
days to be spatial arbitrage. We set α=7 in our primary analysis and varied α for robustness. The 7-day 
interval is reasonable because of the time needed to: a) complete paperwork at the source facility where 
the vehicle was purchased, b) transport the vehicle to the destination facility, and c) register the vehicle 
for sale at the destination facility. Increasing the α threshold increases the probability that we will falsely 
classify a flip as arbitrage, because a longer time period increases the probability that the vehicle has been 
changed/improved or that the dealer is liquidating a vehicle that he failed to retail. An example of an 
instance of spatial arbitrage is as follows: TraderID #111 purchased a vehicle with VIN 
1B3EL36R54N976952 at the Miami facility on February 10, 2003 for $10,000 and then sold the vehicle 
at the New Orleans facility on February 13, 2003 for $11,500. 
2.5 Analysis 
 
2.5.1 Testing H1: The association between electronic commerce, the number of arbitrage 
opportunities, and the percentage of opportunities that are exploited 
 
We estimated the number of spatial arbitrage opportunities in the market by assessing whether each 
vehicle j purchased at facility k on day t could have been profitably arbitraged at a different facility l 
within α days (we set α=7 and varied it for robustness). We did this as follows. First, we matched vehicles 
sold at each facility k (the source facility) on day t to vehicles sold at every other facility l (the destination 
facilities) between day t+1 and day t+α. We matched on VehicleYear, Make, Model, Mileage (coarsened 




the vehicle from the source facility could have been profitably arbitraged at each matching destination 
facility by taking the mean Price of the matched vehicles at the destination facility and subtracting out 
Price at the source facility, the estimated transport cost between the facilities, and transaction fees 
(including the BuyFee at the source facility and the mean SellFee at the destination facility).6 If this 
difference was more than $500 (after adjusting for inflation), we counted this as an arbitrage opportunity 
(we also used $0, $100, and $1,000 for robustness and achieved similar results). For example, a 2002 
Dodge Neon with Mileage = 18,932 and Valuation = $6,468 was purchased (Price=$5,200) at the Denver 
facility on October 9, 2003. We identified five matching vehicles (i.e., 2002 Dodge Neons with Mileage 
between 18,000 and 19,000 and Valuation between $6,000 and $7,000) sold on October 14 at the Phoenix 
facility (mean Price=$6,660) and three matching vehicles sold on October 14 at the Dallas facility (mean 
Price=$5,433). Given the price differences, estimated transport costs, and transaction fees, we determined 
that Phoenix represented a profitable arbitrage opportunity but that Dallas did not. Thus, for the 2002 
Dodge Neon purchased at Denver on October 9, we identified one arbitrage opportunity (in Phoenix).7 
Panel A of Figure 2.3 shows that the number of arbitrage opportunities decreased by 72% over our 
sample period, from an estimated 1,532,232 in 2003 to 426,122 in 2010. Panel B shows that the number 
                                                          
6 See the appendix for a description of how we estimated transport costs. Other potential transaction costs 
involved in spatial arbitrage include taxes and the cost of capital. Taxes are not relevant because dealers 
do not pay taxes when purchasing vehicles in the wholesale market (tax is collected on retail 
transactions). The cost of capital is relevant if arbitrageurs purchase vehicles using debt (e.g., a line of 
credit) and must pay interest until they retire the debt. This cost is negligible for our analysis because the 
arbitrageurs hold vehicles for a very short time (no more than 7 days in our focal analysis); i.e., there is 
little time for interest to accrue. 
7 This approach assumes that moving a matched vehicle from the source facility to the destination facility 
would not change the estimated price at the destination facility. This is questionable, because the 
additional supply at the destination facility would likely lower prices. This will cause our estimates of the 
number of arbitrage opportunities to be biased upward. However, this bias will be consistent across all 8 
years of our sample. Given this consistency, the year-over-year decline shown in Figure 2.3 can still be 
interpreted as a decline in the number of arbitrage opportunities. Any other form of mismeasurement that 




of arbitrage opportunities that were exploited (i.e., the number of arbitrage transactions) also decreased 
over time (by 46%).8 Panel D shows that electronic trading via both channels increased over time, with 
most of the electronic trading occurring via the webcast channel. Taken together, this indicates that 
efficiency increased as electronic trading became more prevalent. The correlations between the time 
series for the percentage of electronic trading and a) the number of arbitrage opportunities, and b) the 
number of arbitrage opportunities that were exploited (i.e., the number of arbitrage transactions) are -0.98 
(p<0.01) and -0.95 (p<0.01).9 This supports H1a. Panel C shows that the percentage of arbitrage 
opportunities that were exploited increased by 93% over our sample period, from 2.4% to 4.7%. The 
correlation between the time series for the percentage of electronic trading and the percentage of arbitrage 
opportunities that were exploited is 0.96 (p<0.01). This supports H1b and suggests that electronic 
commerce improved the ability for arbitrageurs to exploit inefficiencies, even as it decreased the overall 
number of inefficiencies. In other words, the market became more efficient, and the inefficiencies that 




                                                          
8 Overall, spatial arbitrage is rare. Less than 1% of purchased vehicles are later spatially arbitraged (with α=7). This 
is consistent with theoretical work about arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
9 To verify that the declines shown in Panels A and B of Figure 2.3 are not simply artifacts of a reduction 
in overall transaction volume, we also calculated the time series for the percentages of arbitrage 
opportunities and arbitrage transactions relative to total market transactions. These time series mirrored 
those shown in Panels A and B (the correlations between these time series and those in panels A and B 
are 0.99 and 0.98, respectively). 
10 The reduction in arbitrage transactions (Panel B) suggests that the (negative) “opportunity reduction” 





A: # of spatial arbitrage 
opportunities 
B: # of spatial arbitrage opportunities 
exploited (i.e., number of arbitrage 
transactions) 
C: % of spatial arbitrage 
opportunities exploited 
D: % of electronic transactions (top: 
overall; middle: webcast channel; 
bottom: standalone elec. market) 
 
    
 
Figure 2.3: Spatial arbitrage and electronic trading trends over time. 
2.5.2 Testing H2: The effect of different types of electronic commerce on the prevalence of spatial 
arbitrage 
2.5.2.1 Testing the effect of the webcast channel: We tested the effect of the webcast channel on spatial 
arbitrage by leveraging the phased adoption of the webcast channel to conduct a quasi-natural experiment 
(e.g., Jensen 2007, Overby and Forman 2014 ). Because the webcast technology was deployed at different 
times for each lane at each facility, we observe many instances in which similar vehicles were sold at the 
same facility on the same day, some in lanes that were webcast enabled and some in lanes that weren’t. 
We considered the former to be potential “treated” vehicles and the latter potential “control” vehicles. If 
whether a vehicle was sold in a webcast enabled lane was randomly assigned, then we could identify the 
treatment effect of the webcast channel via a simple comparison of outcomes for the treated and control 
vehicles. However, as with much observational data, that is not the case. When the webcast channel was 
deployed, sellers and facility managers (who collectively determine the lanes in which vehicles are 
offered) tended to use webcast enabled lanes for vehicles whose Year/Make/Model (e.g., 2002 Audi TT) 
were only available in a few facilities (so buyers from other areas could bid for them electronically)11 
                                                          
11 As support for this, we calculated the following for the first quarter of 2003: a) the number of vehicles 
of each Year/Make/Model sold in webcast-enables lanes (μ=5.4, σ=42.1), b) the number of vehicles of 
each Year/Make/Model sold overall (μ=156.4, σ=601.8), and c) the number of facilities at which vehicles 
of each Year/Make/Model were sold (μ=22.7, σ=23.4). We regressed (a) on (b) and (c). The coefficient 
for (c) was -0.09 (t=-4.90), such that a one standard deviation increase in the number of facilities at which 
a vehicle was sold was associated with a 39% decrease in the number of vehicles sold in webcast-enables 




























and that were relatively new with low mileage (so personal inspection of the vehicle was not required to 
assess quality). These assignment criteria became less relevant over time as the webcast channel was 
increasingly deployed. Nevertheless, vehicles sold in webcast and non-webcast enabled lanes differed in 
VehicleYear, Make, Model, Mileage, and Valuation (see Table 2.4). 
Although assignment to webcast enabled lanes was not random, because we know the factors that 
influenced assignment (VehicleYear, Make, Model, and Mileage), we control for them. This allows us to 
conduct a meaningful comparison of treated and control vehicles. To do this (and to control for other 
factors), we matched control vehicles to treated vehicles on VehicleYear, Make, Model, Mileage, 
Valuation, FacilityID, SellerType, SellerPctArbitraged, and SaleDate (see Table 2.3). This increases the 
likelihood that the only material difference between control and treated vehicles are that the latter were 
sold on webcast enabled lanes. This allows us to attribute any significant differences in whether these 
vehicles are later arbitraged to the “treatment effect” of being sold in a webcast enabled lane. Essentially, 
the matched control vehicles serve as counterfactuals for what would have happened to the treated 
vehicles if they had not been treated, thereby allowing us to estimate a causal treatment effect (see Iacus 
et al. 2011). Matching on FacilityID is a key part of our identification strategy. In many cases, this allows 
us to compare vehicles sold in a webcast enabled lanes to very similar vehicles sold in a non-enabled lane 
just a few feet away. Matching on SellerPctArbitraged is also important, because this controls for a host 
of unobserved seller characteristics that influence the probability that vehicles they sell are arbitraged. 
One such characteristic is how effective sellers are at distributing vehicles to the “right” locations so that 
they don’t sell for below-market discounts (and hence become good candidates for arbitrage). 
We matched vehicles using exact matching and coarsened exact matching (“CEM”). Each treated 
                                                          





vehicle could only be matched to a control vehicle with the same FacilityID, VehicleYear, Make, Model, 
and SellerType. We also restricted matches to vehicles sold in the same week. We coarsened 
SellerPctArbitraged into bins of width 0.112 and Valuation and Mileage into bins of width 1,000, and we 
only allowed matches between vehicles in the same bins.13 Because there were essentially no potential 
control vehicles available after 2007 (because the webcast channel was almost fully deployed by then; see 
Figure 2.2), we restricted the analysis to observations between 2003 and 2007. The matching procedure 
yielded 19,095 matched strata/cells that each contained at least one treated vehicle and at least one control 
vehicle. For example, the procedure produced a stratum/cell for 2003 Ford Taurus’s with Mileage 
between 22,000 and 23,000 and Valuation between $10,000 and $11,000 sold at the Minneapolis facility 
by institutional sellers whose SellerPctArbitraged was between 0.0036 and 0.004 in the second week of 
2004; there was one treated vehicle and one control vehicle in this stratum. 
To ensure that the procedure resulted in comparable matches, we examined the balance between the 
treated and control observations as follows. First, we set DayOfWeek = 1…7 based on which day of the 
week a vehicle was sold, with Monday = 1. Second, we calculated the means of Valuation, Mileage, 
SellerPctArbitraged, and DayOfWeek for the treated and control vehicles in each of the 19,095 strata in 
the matched sample, referred to as the strata means. We then used a t-test to examine whether these strata 
means differed significantly between the treated and control groups. As shown in Table 2.4, only 
                                                          
12 Because SellerPctArbitraged ≤ 0.004 for over half of the observations, we further coarsened the 0 to 
0.1 bin into the following bins: 0 to 0.0003, 0.0003 to 0.0006, 0.006 to 0.009, …, 0.0033 to 0.0036, 
0.0036 to 0.004, and 0.004 to 0.1. We also used a single bin for values between 0.5 and 1, given the rarity 
of observations with these values. 
13 Coarsened exact matching temporarily coarsens each chosen variable into bins and exact matches on 
those bins, yielding a matched sample of control and treated observations. CEM then restores the original 
(non-coarsened) values of the variables for analysis. The CEM matching procedure may match an uneven 
number of control observations to treated observations. To account for this, CEM generates weights. 
Using these weights in an analysis procedure (such as regression) generates the sample average treatment 




SellerPctArbitraged showed a significant differences between the two groups after matching, and this 
difference was of minimal practical significance (recall that matches are exact for all other variables). 
Table 2.4 also compares the variables across groups before matching.14 Overall, we believe that our 
matches are precise enough to satisfy the un-confoundedness condition (aka, selection on observables) for 
valid matching estimation (Imbens, 2004). However, despite this precision, it is possible that unobserved 
differences could make the control vehicles inappropriate counterfactuals for the treated vehicles. For this 
to be a problem, the following conditions would have to hold. First, there would have to be unobserved 
vehicle characteristics (not captured in our matching procedure) that are correlated with a vehicle being 
arbitraged. Second, sellers and managers at the facilities – who collectively determine the lane in which 
vehicles are offered – would have to know what these characteristics are. Third, sellers and facility 
managers would have to consistently offer vehicles with these characteristics in non-webcast enabled 
lanes, while offering the other vehicles in enabled lanes (or vice versa). Although we cannot be sure that 
these conditions do not hold, they are unlikely. For one thing, it is unlikely that sellers and facility 
managers would be able to identify the variables – beyond those included in our matching – that 
consistently predict arbitrage, partly because arbitrage occurs rarely. Also, sellers might want to predict 
arbitrage if by doing so they could identify “mis”-distributed vehicles and move them to a more 
advantageous selling location, thereby retaining the arbitrageurs’ profits for themselves. However, 
Overby and Clarke (2012) showed that sellers have little incentive to try to do this, because the revenues 
they forgo when they “mis”-distribute a vehicle that is later arbitraged are minimal compared to their total 
revenues. Last, there may be unobserved variables (e.g., scratches, dents) that influence both whether a 
                                                          
14 Although the means of the variables in the matched sample differ from those in the full data, we 
believe the matched sample is a good representation of the overall data. This is because the 95% 
confidence intervals around Mileage and Valuation in the matched sample cover 94% of the transactions 
in our data. I.e., the matched sample contains many matches of not only low mileage, high value vehicles 




vehicle is offered in a webcast enabled lane and its price. But if such variables cause a price discount 
(premium) at an arbitrageur’s source location, they will also cause a discount (premium) at the destination 
location, such that potential arbitrage profits would be unaffected. Thus, such variables should not affect 
the likelihood of arbitrage. We also considered whether buyer heterogeneity across the webcast enabled 
and non-webcast enabled lanes might confound our result. We found this to be unlikely, because almost 
all buyers who purchased in webcast lanes also purchased in non-webcast enabled lanes, and vice versa 
(see the appendix for details). In addition, we conducted a sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum 2002) to 
assess how influential any unobservables would have to be to alter our conclusion (discussed below). 
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics for treated and control observations for testing the effect of the webcast 












Difference in means 
(t-stat) 
A: Before Matching 
Valuation n/a 15,892,484 9,058,903 11,841.36 8,521.38 3,319.98 (1049.53) 
Mileage n/a 15,892,484 9,058,903 54,291.36 76,537.35 -22,245.99 (-1047.43) 
SellerPctArbitraged n/a 15,892,484 9,058,903 0.0068 0.0067 0.0001 (5.12) 
DayOfWeek n/a 15,892,484 9,058,903 3.12  3.04  0.08 (201.49) 
B: After Matching 
Valuation 19,095 36,027 26,810 11,960.21 11,960.52 -0.31 (-0.25) 
Mileage 19,095 36,027 26,810 38,633.18 38,636.40 -3.22 (1.26) 
SellerPctArbitraged 19,095 36,027 26,810 0.00538 0.00530 0.00008 (2.01) 
DayOfWeek 19,095 36,027 26,810 3.13 3.14 -0.01 (1.57) 
 
Using the matched sample, we fitted the following logistic regression model to test the treatment 
effect of webcast enablement on whether a vehicle is arbitraged: logit(probability(Arbitragedj = 1)) = β0 
+ β1*WebcastEnabledj + εj. Arbitragedj is set to 1 if vehicle j was arbitraged and 0 otherwise. 
WebcastEnabledj is set to 1 if vehicle j was sold in a webcast enabled lane and 0 otherwise. We fitted the 
model on the matched sample using weighted regression, with the weights provided by the CEM 
procedure (see footnote 13.) We set α=7 to delineate whether a vehicle was arbitraged in our focal model, 




events logistic regression model, and b) a linear probability model of the form Arbitragedj = β0 + 
β1*WebcastEnabledj + εj. Results are virtually identical to those we report. In other unreported analysis, 
we estimated the model after adding Valuationj, Mileagej, SellerPctArbitragedj, SaleDatej, and indicator 
variables for each FacilityIDj as explanatory variables. These variables are already accounted for via the 
matching procedure, and their inclusion has no substantive effect on the WebcastEnabledj coefficient. 
(SellerPctArbitragedj is positive and significant in this specification, as expected.) 
Table 2.5: Treatment effects of the vehicle being purchased on a webcast enabled lane (panel A) and in 
the standalone electronic channel (panel B) on whether the vehicle is later arbitraged. 
 
A: Webcast Channel 
WebcastEnabledj (β1) -0.351 (0.137) *** 
Intercept (β0) -5.494 (0.096) *** 
n 62,837  
Log likelihood; χ2 (1) -1425; 6.55 *** 
B: Standalone Electronic Market 
StandaloneElectronicMarketj (β1) 0.644 (0.102) *** 
Intercept (β0) -5.596 (0.075) *** 
n 83,611  
Log likelihood; χ2 (1) -2416; 39.61 *** 
The dependent variable is the probability that the vehicle is later arbitraged. Model estimated via logistic 
regression. Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001). 
Results shown with α=7, where α denotes the number of days between flips used to delineate spatial arbitrage. 
 
Panel A of Table 2.5 shows the results. The treatment effect of webcast enablement is captured by β1. 
The effect is negative and significant; treated vehicles (i.e., those sold in webcast enabled lanes) were 
approximately 29%-39% less likely to be arbitraged than were control vehicles, depending on the value of 
α.15 This indicates that the webcast channel reduces the prevalence of spatial arbitrage. We also tested 
the effect of the webcast channel using McNemar’s test (1947). Because this test requires matched pairs, 
we restricted the matched sample to only those strata/cells that contained one treated vehicle and one 
                                                          
15 We also used α=5, 14, and 28 days. We obtained the 29%-39% estimates by exponentiating the β1 
coefficients and by analyzing the results of the linear probability model (we divided β1 by β0 from the 




control vehicle (n=11,873 strata). For each of the matched pairs, one of four outcomes is possible: a) both 
the control and the treated vehicle were arbitraged (n=1 in our case), b) only the control vehicle was 
arbitraged (n=77), c) only the treated vehicle was arbitraged (n=52), and d) neither vehicle was arbitraged 
(n=11,743). McNemar’s test examines whether the probabilities for the (b) and (c) outcomes are 
statistically different. As above, treated vehicles were significantly less likely to be arbitraged than were 
control vehicles (χ2(1) =4.84; p<0.05). The percentage decrease between (b) and (c) is approximately 32%, 
which matches the effect size reported above.  
We examined how sensitive our results might be to the possibility that unobserved variables cause 
vehicles that are likely to be arbitraged to be offered in non-webcast enabled lanes. If that were the case, 
then the effect we observe might be attributable to these unobservables and not to the treatment effect of 
the webcast channel. We conducted a sensitivity analysis based on McNemar’s test to see how influential 
these unobservables would have to be to alter our conclusion (see Rosenbaum 2002, §4.3.2 for details on 
this procedure). We concluded that in order to attribute the higher rate of arbitrage in non-webcast 
enabled lanes to unobservables, the unobservables would need to: a) be a near perfect predictor of 
arbitrage, and b) produce a 17% increase in the odds of a vehicle being offered in a non-webcast enabled 
lane (i.e., Γ=1.17 in sensitivity analysis notation). Although there is no consensus about the appropriate 
size for Γ in social science research, Γ=1.2 is around average (Sen, 2014).16  
2.5.2.2 Testing the effect of the standalone electronic market: To examine the effect of the 
standalone electronic market on spatial arbitrage, we used a similar matching procedure as above, with 
one major change. We considered vehicles sold in the standalone electronic market to be potential treated 
vehicles, with vehicles sold in the physical market – regardless of whether they were sold in a webcast 
                                                          
16 No value of Γ can prove that a matching procedure is or is not valid. Γ is simply an indication of how 
much of a confounding influence unobserved variables would have to have to alter a conclusion. For the 




enabled lane – as potential control vehicles. We ran the matching procedure using the data from January 
1, 2005 to December 31, 2010, as we observe minimal transaction volume in the standalone electronic 
market prior to 2005. The matching procedure yielded 26,937 matched strata consisting of 83,611 
vehicles: 29,612 treated vehicles and 53,999 control vehicles. The balance between treated and control 
observations was good except for the DayOfWeek variable, as shown in Table 2.6. As a robustness check, 
we assessed whether the imbalance for DayOfWeek affected our results by exact matching on 
observations with the same DayOfWeek. These results are consistent with those we report below. Our 
regression specifications were identical to those for analyzing the effect of the webcast channel, except 
we replaced WebcastEnabledj with StandaloneElectronicMarketj.  
Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics for treated and control observations for testing the effect of the 












Difference in means 
(t-stat) 
A: Before Matching 
Valuation n/a 723,637 27,478,654 17,324.16 10,715.69 6,608.46 (519.39) 
Mileage n/a 723,637 27,478,654 39,916.42 66,065.39 -26,148.97 (-423.81) 
SellerPctArbitraged n/a 723,637 27,478,654 0.0054 0.0062 -0.0007 (30.19) 
DayOfWeek n/a 723,637 27,478,654 2.82 3.09 -0.27 (-219.81) 
B: After Matching 
Valuation 26,937 29,612 53,999 14,650.68 14,650.73 -0.04 (0.047) 
Mileage 26,937 29,612 53,999 24,936.70 24,939.47 -2.76 (1.22) 
SellerPctArbitraged 26,937 29,612 53,999 0.00560 0.00563 -0.00003 (-2.17) 
DayOfWeek 26,937 29,612 53,999 3.05 2.70 0.35 (40.00) 
 
Results of the logistic regression appear in Panel B of Table 2.5; results of the other models are 
virtually identical. β1 is positive and significant. Vehicles purchased in the standalone electronic market 
are 55%-117% more likely to be arbitraged than vehicles in the physical market, depending on the value 
of α. We also tested the effect of the standalone electronic market using McNemar’s test, as above. In this 
test, the “both arbitraged” outcome has n=2 observations, the “control arbitraged, treated not” outcome 




n=15,906. Treated vehicles were significantly more likely to be arbitraged than were control vehicles 
(χ2(1) =15.52; p<0.01); the percentage increase is approximately 83%. 
Sellers decide whether to offer vehicles in the standalone electronic market or the physical market, 
and they also decide what prices to accept. If unobserved factors influence these decisions and whether a 
vehicle is likely to be arbitraged, then our result could be biased. One possibility is that sellers accept 
below-market prices for vehicles in the standalone electronic market (i.e., they “dump” vehicles for less 
than they are worth), which would create arbitrage opportunities. This does not appear to be the case, 
because the Price/Valuation ratio is significantly higher for vehicles sold in the standalone electronic 
market than in the physical market (101% to 99%; p<0.01). Another possibility is that sellers offer in the 
standalone electronic market vehicles with unobserved vehicle characteristics that are correlated with 
arbitrage. For this to be true, sellers would have to: a) know which unobservables are correlated with 
arbitrage, b) identify vehicles that have these unobservables, and c) offer these vehicles consistently on 
the standalone electronic market and not in the physical market. For the reasons described in §2.5.2.1, we 
believe this to be unlikely. In addition, we used the same procedure as above to analyze how sensitive our 
results are to the possibility that unobserved variables cause vehicles that are inherently likely to be 
arbitraged to be offered in the standalone electronic market. To attribute the higher rate of arbitrage in the 
standalone electronic market to these unobservables, they would need to predict arbitrage almost 
perfectly, and they would need to produce more than a 48% increase in the odds of a vehicle being 
offered in the standalone electronic market (Γ=1.49). Also, see the appendix for a discussion of why 
buyer heterogeneity is unlikely to confound our conclusion. 
Overall, H2 is supported. The two forms of electronic commerce have different effects on the 




(the standalone electronic market) having a more positive effect.17 
2.5.2.3 Analysis of the mechanisms behind the effects of the two electronic channels: According to 
our theory, the expanded reach that electronic commerce provides should reduce arbitrage opportunities 
by helping remotely-located buyers – who might otherwise be potential “downstream” customers for 
arbitrageurs – purchase vehicles directly from source locations. Our theory also suggests that expanded 
reach should help arbitrageurs identify and exploit previously hidden arbitrage opportunities. It also 
suggests that arbitrageurs should leverage transaction immediacy to quickly identify and exploit arbitrage 
opportunities originating in the standalone electronic market. Whether these mechanisms increase or 
decrease the amount of arbitrage depends on whether the “opportunity reduction” effect outpaces the 
“opportunity exploitation” effect.  
To explore this for the webcast channel, we first confirmed that the webcast channel led to expanded 
buyer reach. We used the matched sample and the regression specifications from §2.5.2.1 to test the 
treatment effect of a vehicle being offered in a webcast enabled lane on the likelihood of its being 
purchased by a remotely-located buyer (RemoteBuyer). We set RemoteBuyer = 1 if the distance between 
the buyer and the facility at which the vehicle was located (i.e., BuyerDistance; see Table 2.3) was at least 
one standard deviation above the mean (and two standard deviations for robustness); RemoteBuyer = 0 
otherwise. Vehicles purchased from webcast enabled lanes were 15%-35% more likely to be purchased 
by a remote buyer (p<0.01), depending on the measure of “remote”.18 We also tested the treatment effect 
of the webcast channel on vehicle price (Price), finding a 0.5% increase (p<0.01), perhaps due to an 
increase in the number of buyers bidding on the vehicles (although our data do not report the number of 
                                                          
17 The effects of the two channels are statistically different from each other because one is negative and 
significantly different from zero and the other is positive and significantly different from zero. 




bidders). The RemoteBuyer result could reflect both the “opportunity reduction” effect (due to regular 
buyers purchasing at remote locations) and the “opportunity exploitation” effect (due to arbitrageurs 
finding vehicles in remote locations that can be profitably arbitraged). But the Price result should pertain 
only to “opportunity reduction” because it increases the arbitrageurs’ cost of sourcing vehicles. On 
balance, the “opportunity reduction” effect seems to dominate the “opportunity exploitation” effect, 
generating the negative effect of the webcast channel. 
We used an analogous procedure to test the effects of the standalone electronic market on 
RemoteBuyer and Price. Results are similar; vehicles purchased in the standalone electronic market were 
72%-83% (p<0.01) more likely to be purchased by a remote buyer (depending on the measure of 
“remote”) and had 1.1% higher prices (p<0.01). The key difference between the webcast channel and the 
standalone electronic market is that the latter provides transaction immediacy, which our theory suggests 
will help arbitrageurs identify and exploit arbitrage opportunities. If this is happening, then we should see 
arbitrageurs purchasing undervalued vehicles in the standalone electronic market very soon after they are 
listed there. To explore this, we obtained supplemental data that contained additional variables for 55% 
(n=337,295) of the transactions that occurred in the standalone electronic market between 2007 and 
2010.19 We used two variables in particular: the date the vehicle was listed on the standalone electronic 
market (ListingDate) and whether a vehicle was purchased via auction (either before or after the reserve 
price was met) or via “Buy Now” (TransactionType). Using the supplemental data, we calculated 
DaysToSale, which is the number of days between a vehicle’s ListingDate and SaleDate. We also 
                                                          
19 These additional variables were not available before 2007 or for all transactions between 2007 and 
2010. We checked the representativeness of the transactions for which the variables were available by 
comparing vehicles’ Mileage, VehicleYear, and Valuation between these supplemental data and the full 
set of transactions in the standalone electronic market between 2007 and 2010. The mean Mileage for the 
supplemental data (full data) was 37,457 (39,968), the mean VehicleYear was 2006.8 (2006.5), and the 
mean Valuation was 17,625 (17,186). Although these means are statistically different at p<0.01, the 




calculated PriceValRatio, which is the ratio of a vehicle’s Price to its Valuation. We computed the mean 
of these two variables, both in aggregate and by TransactionType. Results appear in column A of Table 7. 
Of the 337,295 vehicles purchased in the supplemental data, 1,967 of these were spatially arbitraged. 
Column B of Table 7 shows the mean of DaysToSale and PriceValRatio for the arbitraged vehicles.  
Table 2.7: Statistics for DaysToSale and PriceValRatio for transactions in the supplemental data. 
 
 A: Supplemental data: All 
transactions 
B: Supplemental data: 
Arbitrage transactions 
 n Mean (St. Dev.) n Mean (St. Dev.) 
DaysToSale: All Transactions 337,295 1.76 (2.85) 1,967 0.81 (1.87) 
  - Buy Now Transactions 195,062 1.91 (3.36) 1,059  0.76 (2.13) 
  - Auction Transactions (above hidden reserve price) 119,732 1.69 (1.81) 690 0.96 (1.57) 
  - Auction Transactions (below hidden reserve price) 22,501 0.85 (2.25) 218  0.61 (1.27) 
PriceValRatio: All Transactions 337,295 1.01 (0.17) 1,967 0.95 (0.13) 
  - Buy Now Transactions 195,062 1.02 (0.18) 1,059  0.96 (0.14) 
  - Auction Transactions (above hidden reserve price) 119,732 1.01 (0.15) 690 0.96 (0.11) 
  - Auction Transactions (below hidden reserve price) 22,500 0.97 (0.14) 218  0.92 (0.10) 
 
Consistent with our theorizing, arbitrageurs used the standalone electronic market to purchase 
undervalued vehicles more successfully than did “regular” buyers: the mean PriceValRatio paid by 
arbitrageurs was 95%, whereas the overall mean was 101% (the difference between these means is 
significant at p<0.01). Also, arbitrageurs purchased vehicles very soon after they were listed: arbitrageurs 
waited only 0.81 days (on average), which is less than half as long as the overall average of 1.76 days (the 
difference is significant at p<0.01). The time between listing and purchase for arbitrageurs was 
particularly short for Buy Now transactions and for auction transactions that occurred before the reserve 
price was met. This suggests that arbitrageurs likely use the standalone electronic market to scan for 
vehicles with undervalued Buy Now prices, leveraging the market’s transaction immediacy to purchase 
them quickly. Also, arbitrageurs likely are quick to register “low-ball” bids for vehicles that – if accepted 
– lead to profitable arbitrage opportunities. Although many of these bids are likely beaten, some sellers 




available to an arbitrageur when sourcing vehicles in the physical market, regardless of whether he is 
participating via webcast or physically. We explored this further by estimating the profit for each 
arbitrage transaction using the formula noted in §5.1. The average arbitrage profit is $781 (st. dev. 1,030) 
when the vehicle was sourced from the standalone electronic market and $672 (st. dev. 710) when the 
vehicle was sourced from the physical market (via either the traditional physical channel or the webcast 
channel). This difference in profits is significant at p<0.01. Also, the percentage of arbitrage transactions 
that were profitable is higher for vehicles sourced in the standalone electronic market (91.6% vs. 88.6%; p 
< 0.01). The overall pattern of results suggests that the arbitrage “opportunity exploitation” effect is much 
stronger in the standalone electronic market than in the webcast channel because the former supports 
transaction immediacy. As a result, the “opportunity exploitation” effect appears to outpace the 
“opportunity reduction” effect in the standalone electronic market, generating the positive effect of the 
standalone electronic market on spatial arbitrage. 
2.5.3 Testing H3 and H4: Factors that affect arbitrageur behavior of where to source products 
 
We used a discrete choice model to study how arbitrageurs choose where to source vehicles. Fitting a 
choice model requires the researcher to define the set of alternatives available to the decision-maker 
(referred to as the choice set) and to specify a utility function for each alternative (Train 2009). We 
observe the facility at which arbitrageur i on day t sourced a vehicle(s) that he later arbitraged; this is the 
“chosen” alternative in each choice set. We defined the “non-chosen” alternatives in the choice set as 
those facilities other than the chosen facility: a) that were open on day t, and b) at which arbitrageur i 
made a purchase during the sample period. We modeled the utility of each facility k to arbitrageur i at 
time t as Uikt = β0,k + β1*PctOfferedWebcastkt + β2*Distanceik + β3*Distanceik*NearbyFacilitiesk + 
β4*Supplykt + β5*Supply
2
kt + β6*PctSoldk(t-30) +  β7*PctSoldLowPricek(t-30) + β8*GeoPriceDispersionk(t-30) 




Table 2.8: Variables used in the discrete choice model of where arbitrageurs source vehicles. 
Variable Description Mean (St. Dev.) 
PctOffered 
Webcastkt 
The percentage of vehicles at facility k that were offered in webcast enabled 
lanes on day t. 
0.62 (0.41) 
Distanceik The distance in miles between the zip codes of arbitrageur i and facility k. 535.23 (528.18) 
NearbyFacilitieska The number of facilities within 350 miles of facility k. 20 (8) 
Supplykt The number of vehicles offered at facility k on day t. 783.40 (765.07) 
PctSoldk(t-30) 
The percentage of vehicles offered at facility k in the 30 days prior to day t 




The percentage of vehicles sold at facility k in the 30 days prior to day t that 




The average geographic price dispersion of the vehicles offered at facility k 
in the 30 days prior to day t. We measured this as follows. First, for each 
vehicle offered at facility k on day t, we created a list of all facilities at 
which vehicles of the same year/model were purchased in the 30 days prior 
to day t. Second, we calculated the average price for those vehicles at each 
facility during that time period. Third, we took the standard deviation of 
these average prices across facilities. This gave us a measure of how much 
the price of each vehicle offered at facility k on day t varied across 
facilities. Fourth, we averaged these measures for all vehicles offered at 
facility k on day t. 
1537.77 (242.00) 
a We also ran the model using the following different thresholds to define NearbyFacilitiesk: 100 miles, 200 miles, 
and 700 miles. Results are substantively unchanged. 
b We also ran the model using the following different thresholds to define PctSoldLowPricek(t-30): 80% and 85%. 
Results are substantively unchanged. 
 
We included PctSoldLowPricek(t-30) and GeoPriceDispersionk(t-30) to test arbitrageur preferences for 
facilities at which a high percentage of vehicles are likely to be available for low prices and at which 
prices for the vehicles offered vary widely across facilities (H3a and H3b). We included Distanceik to test 
arbitrageur preferences for facilities close to them (H4a). We tested H4b (that arbitrageurs prefer facilities 
that are relatively difficult for other traders to access) in two ways. First, we interacted Distanceik with 
NearbyFacilitiesk, reasoning that facilities located near other facilities are relatively easy for other traders 
to access, given that the location of the facilities closely matches the population density of the U.S.20 
Second, we included PctOfferedWebcastkt, reasoning that the more the vehicles at a facility are available 
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and cannot be estimated separately from each facility’s alternative-specific constant, which is represented 




via webcast, the more accessible (electronically) that facility is to traders. Further, including 
PctOfferedWebcastkt allowed us to test whether arbitrageurs prefer sourcing vehicles at facilities at which 
the webcast channel has been deployed only minimally or not at all, which one might expect given the 
negative effect of the webcast channel on spatial arbitrage shown in §5.2.1. We included Supplykt, 
Supply2kt, and PctSoldk(t-30) to account for the role that facilities’ size and liquidity play in arbitrageurs’ 
sourcing decisions. We used 30-day lagged variables (noted by the t-30 subscript) for PctSoldk(t-30), 
PctSoldLowPricek(t-30), and GeoPriceDispersionk(t-30) because the contemporaneous values of these 
variables are unknown to arbitrageurs when they choose the facility at which to purchase. We used 
contemporaneous variables for the other variables because arbitrageurs either already know them (e.g., 
Distanceik) or can calculate them based on the “pre-sale” list of vehicles posted in advance on the 
intermediary’s web site. We included alternative-specific constants to capture the latent utility (i.e., the 
fixed effect) of each facility k (represented as the β0,k term) and fitted the model using the multinomial 
logit specification. Results appear in Table 9.  
Table 2.9: Results of the discrete choice model of where arbitrageurs source vehicles. 
 Coefficient (Std. Error) 
PctOfferedWebcastkt (β1) -0.3420 (0.0225) *** 
Distanceik (β2) -0.5025 (0.0322) *** 
Distanceik*NearbyFacilitiesk (β3) -0.0383 (0.0017) *** 
Supplykt (β4) 3.5414 (0.0217) *** 
Supply2kt (β5) -0.5477 (0.0054) *** 
PctSoldk(t-30) (β6) -2.1817 (0.0606) *** 
PctSoldLowPricek(t-30) (β7) 1.0042 (0.1072) *** 
GeoPriceDispersionk(t-30) (β8) 0.0041 (0.1030)  
Alternative specific constants included 
Number of choices in choice set (Min, mean, max) 2, 5.9, 48 
n (total number of choices) 698057 
Log Likelihood  -115480 
The number of days used to delineate spatial arbitrage (α) is set to 7 in this analysis. Results are consistent for α=5, 
α=14, and α=28. Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001). To ensure that coefficients are 
of similar magnitude for reporting purposes we divided Supplykt, Distanceik and GeoPriceDispersionk(t-30) by 1000. 
 




model estimates to simulate the size (i.e., practical significance) of this effect as follows. We simulated 
the percentage change in the number of times arbitrageur i chose facility k when PctSoldLowPricek(t-30) = 
10% vs. 30% (i.e., one standard deviation below and above the mean). We did this for each facility. On 
average, this increased the probability of choosing a facility by approximately 20%. H3b is not supported; 
the coefficient for GeoPriceDispersionk(t-30) is positive (as posited) but insignificant. H4a is supported; the 
coefficient for Distanceik is negative and significant. We simulated the size of the Distanceik effect by 
estimating the percentage change in the number of times an arbitrageur chose facility k when Distanceik = 
250 vs. when Distanceik = 750, with NearbyFacilitiesk set at its mean, which is 20. The increased distance 
reduced the probability of choosing a facility by 21%. H4b is also supported; the interaction between 
Distanceik and NearbyFacilitiesk is negative and significant. This shows that if two facilities are 
equidistant, the arbitrageur will prefer the one that is more isolated. To examine the effect of 
NearbyFacilitiesk, we set Distanceik at its mean and ran the simulations with NearbyFacilitiesk set to 12 
and 28. This increased density (and greater accessibility) reduced the probability of choosing the facility 
by 14%. The negative and significant coefficient for PctOfferedWebcastkt also provides support for H4b, 
along with corroborating our earlier results about the effect of the webcast channel. To examine the size 
of this effect, we ran the simulations with PctOfferedWebcastkt = 24% and PctOfferedWebcastkt = 71%, 
which are the mean values for this variable in 2003 and 2004 (and represent close to a one standard 
deviation increase). This reduced the probability that an arbitrageur would choose the facility by 13%. 
Supplykt has a positive effect. This may be because a large supply increases an arbitrageur’s chance of 
finding undervalued vehicles. This relationship is concave (i.e., Supply2kt has a negative effect), but the 
inflection point does not occur until Supplykt = 2,532, which is more than 2 standard deviations above the 
mean (note that we scaled Supplykt by dividing by 1,000; see Table 2.9.) Arbitrageurs also prefer to source 
at facilities at which recent sales percentages have been low (PctSoldk(t-30) is negative), i.e., those that have 






Markets can improve social welfare, but the degree to which they generate this benefit depends on the 
degree to which buyers and sellers match efficiently across geographic distance. Electronic commerce can 
help buyers and sellers match across distance by making it easier for them to find and transact with 
trading partners in remote locations. We examined the effect of two distinct forms of electronic commerce 
on market efficiency as measured by the prevalence of spatial arbitrage.  
2.6.1 Contributions and summary of findings 
 
We make three main contributions. Our first contribution is that we measure market efficiency via the 
prevalence of spatial arbitrage rather than via price dispersion. The prevalence of spatial arbitrage has 
several measurement advantages over price dispersion. First, it inherently accounts for the transaction 
costs of moving products between locations. If these transaction costs are lower than the price difference 
between locations (i.e., if supply and demand are inefficiently distributed), then arbitrage will occur. If 
not, it won’t. Second, the spatial arbitrage measure accounts for unobserved product heterogeneity 
because the same product is traded at both the source and destination locations. Unobserved product 
heterogeneity can confound the price dispersion measure if the products whose prices are being compared 
across locations differ due to unobserved quality differences. Third, spatial arbitrage is based on the 
micro-level behavior of the agents – the arbitrageurs – who are most aware of whether buyers and sellers 
are matching efficiently across geography. Thus, arbitrageur behavior provides a direct window into a 
market’s level of efficiency. A potential drawback to the spatial arbitrage measure is that spatial arbitrage 
transactions are difficult to observe. Using spatial arbitrage as the measure requires unique (and 
consistent) identifiers for individual products, traders, and market locations. Although such data are 




item-level tracking becomes more widely adopted.21 We hope that our study encourages others to adopt 
the prevalence of spatial arbitrage to measure market efficiency. 
Our second contribution is that we study two distinct forms of electronic commerce, which helps us 
understand the theoretical mechanisms through which electronic commerce affects market efficiency. 
Both forms – the webcast channel and the standalone electronic market – provide expanded reach. This 
should reduce arbitrage opportunities by helping regular buyers purchase directly from source locations 
(thereby disintermediating arbitrageurs) while simultaneously improving arbitrageurs’ ability to find and 
exploit arbitrage opportunities that s/he might otherwise miss. But only the standalone electronic market 
provides transaction immediacy, which should further enhance arbitrageurs’ ability to find and exploit 
arbitrage opportunities before they dissipate. Our results reveal this nuanced effect: electronic commerce 
reduces arbitrage opportunities but improves arbitrageurs’ ability to find and exploit those that remain. 
The “opportunity reduction” effect dominates the “opportunity exploitation” effect for the webcast 
channel, but the converse is true for the standalone electronic market, which we attribute to the 
transaction immediacy it provides. Thus, the net effect of the webcast channel on the prevalence of spatial 
arbitrage is negative, while the net effect for the standalone electronic market is positive. We summarize 
and illustrate the effects of the two channels in Table 2.10. The cumulative effect of both channels is 




                                                          
21 An example of an item-level tracking system from the agricultural industry is the National Livestock 




Table 2.10: Summary of how the two electronic channels affect spatial arbitrage. 
 Webcast Channel Standalone Electronic Market 
Effect of expanded purchasing reach on spatial arbitrage for:  
“Regular” 
buyers 
Helps them purchase directly from “source” 
locations, reducing arbitrage opportunities.  
↓ Helps them purchase directly from “source” 
locations, reducing arbitrage opportunities. 
↓ 
Arbitrageurs Helps them identify and exploit otherwise 
hidden opportunities in remote locations. 
↑ Helps them identify and exploit otherwise 
hidden opportunities in remote locations. 
↑ 
Effect of transaction immediacy on spatial arbitrage for:    
“Regular” 
buyers 
(The webcast channel does not provide 
transaction immediacy.) 
 -- - 
Arbitrageurs (The webcast channel does not provide 
transaction immediacy.) 
 Helps them identify and purchase undervalued 




Negative: “opportunity reduction” outweighs 
“opportunity exploitation”. 




Our third contribution is that we document several novel findings about arbitrage and how 
arbitrageurs behave. This is important because despite arbitrage’s central place within economic theory, 
data limitations have made arbitrage transactions notoriously difficult to observe. As a result, a key 
mechanism in economic theory about efficient markets has been left largely unexamined; we have either 
taken it on faith or measured it indirectly. We overcome this by using highly granular data to measure 
spatial arbitrage at a transaction-level, which allows us to document new insights about how arbitrageurs 
behave. Among other findings, we find that arbitrageurs prefer to source vehicles at locations that are 
relatively difficult for other market traders to access (both physically and electronically), likely because 
these locations are isolated from the rest of the market. 
Overall, we show that electronic commerce has a more nuanced effect on market efficiency than has 
previously been shown empirically (to our knowledge). Our results are consistent with prior research that 
electronic commerce improves efficiency by helping buyers and sellers trade across distance, thereby 
balancing supply/demand. But we also show that electronic commerce can improve efficiency by 
improving arbitrageurs’ ability to identify and exploit remaining supply/demand imbalances, the act of 




In addition to these contributions to the academic literature, the study has several managerial 
implications. First, it is relevant for spatial arbitrageurs, because it illustrates how their business model is 
being impacted by the diffusion of electronic commerce. Although electronic commerce provides tools to 
make it easier for arbitrageurs to find and exploit arbitrage opportunities, it also reduces the number of 
opportunities. Thus, arbitrageurs should continuously increase the sophistication with which they identify 
and exploit market inefficiencies to maintain their profits. Second, the study has implications for sellers in 
spatially distributed markets who must choose where to sell their products. In inefficient markets – i.e., 
those in which supply and demand are imbalanced – this is a very important decision because prices may 
vary significantly across geography. However, as markets become more efficient through electronic 
commerce, these distribution decisions become less important, allowing sellers to allocate resources to 
other tasks. Third, the study has implications for market intermediaries who provide trading platforms. 
When spatial arbitrage occurs, two transactions are needed for a product to get from the seller at the 
source location to the buyer at the destination location. If the buyer and seller transact directly, then only 
one transaction is needed. Intermediaries who charge fees for each transaction might lose revenue as 
spatial arbitrage becomes less prevalent. 
2.6.2 Limitations and future research 
 
 A limitation of our analysis is that it is specific to the wholesale used vehicle industry. However, 
well-functioning automotive markets are important in their own right, given the surprisingly large impact 
that the automotive industry has on the overall U.S. economy.22 This importance is reflected in several 
academic studies focused on the industry (e.g., Dimoka et al. 2012). Testing whether the results hold for 
other industries represents an opportunity for future research. Another limitation of our analysis is that 
                                                          
22 In 2012, sales at car dealerships represented approximately 15% of total retail sales in the U.S., and 
dealership payroll represented approximately 12% of total retail payroll. Source: National Automobile 




many of the results are based on matching estimation in a quasi-natural experimental setting. We have 
matched on many important variables, including market facility, sale date, vehicle year, make, model, 
mileage, valuation, seller type, and the probability that a seller’s vehicles are arbitraged. However, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that unobserved variables might confound our conclusions, although we 
have conducted sensitivity analyses to assess how influential these unobservables would need to be. 
Another limitation is that although we are able to observe spatial arbitrage transactions with a high level 
of precision, the precision is imperfect. It is possible that we have misclassified spatial arbitrage instances, 
although our results are robust to different measures. Last, space and scope limitations preclude us from 
examining other research questions, such as how arbitrageurs choose between the physical market and the 
standalone electronic market when sourcing vehicles for arbitrage and/or when selling vehicles to 









Spatial Arbitrage23 is a fundamental market feature contributing to efficient markets. In spatial 
arbitrage, a good purchased at one location is transported to another location by an arbitrageur and later 
sold. The arbitrageur hopes to earn a profit after the good is sold at the destination.  If many instances of 
spatial arbitrage prevail in markets, it indicates inefficiencies in the market. However, over time,  markets 
become more efficient as prices across geographic distances converge to a difference not exceeding the 
transaction cost (i.e., cost of transportation and associated fees), thereby reducing arbitrage profits to zero 
(Barrett 2008, Takayama and Judge 1964). When arbitrage profits are reduced to negligible levels in 
markets, arbitrageurs do not find it profitable to engage in arbitrage, and markets would be considered 
efficient. Though spatial arbitrage is fundamental to the study of markets, very few studies, given data 
limitations, have been able to identify and study spatial arbitrage. Even fewer are those studies that have 
attempted to study behaviors of arbitrageurs in the context of spatial arbitrage. Research identifying 
instances of spatial arbitrage and arbitrageur behaviors is rare because datasets with identifiers for the 
goods, traders, time, and locations are difficult to obtain. In this paper, using a unique dataset with micro-
level identifiers and information pertaining to goods, traders, and locations, we study the behaviors of 
arbitrageurs and the effect of these behaviors on arbitrage profits. 
Arbitrageurs play a key role in making markets more efficient and in reducing supply/demand 
imbalances. The primary motivation for arbitrageurs is economic profits (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
However, making risk-free profits in markets by means of spatial arbitrage is not easy. Scholars studying 
                                                          
23 One of the fundamental concepts in finance is arbitrage, defined as “the simultaneous purchase and sale of the 





behavioral finance have identified and theorized that capital, cognitive and, rational limitations of 
arbitrageurs inhibit arbitrage. Scholars have both empirically and analytically shown that these limitations 
play a key role in reducing the ability of arbitrageurs to exploit all available opportunities in markets 
(Barberis and Thaler 2003, Mullainathan and Thaler 2000). More recent research in behavioral finance—
namely, the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis—has provided a framework for understanding these limitations 
faced by arbitrageurs, wherein market actors (i.e., both arbitrageurs and regular traders) alter their 
behavior as a reaction to environmental factors (Farmer 2002, Lo 2004). 
The current paper’s motivation stems from a need to understand the behaviors of arbitrageurs, the 
changes of these behaviors, and factors causing these changes (otherwise called adaptations) in markets. 
This paper has three goals. Firstly, we test and confirm the theoretical predictions pertaining to 
arbitrageur specialization as predicted by Shleifer and Vishny. Secondly, we group arbitrageurs based on 
patterns of specialization behaviors exhibited, thus confirming the predictions pertaining to the existence 
of species of traders. Finally, we examine the why by examining antecedents influencing these behavioral 
changes with respect to specialization. 
In the current paper, we empirically examine the following research questions in the context of 
spatial arbitrage: How does specialization affect arbitrage outcomes (i.e., economic profits and number of 
arbitrage instances)? How do specialization strategies of arbitrageurs evolve over time? 
There are three main reasons why these research questions pertaining to arbitrageur specialization 
are important. Firstly, spatial arbitrage in itself is a very important determinant of market efficiency and is 
an outcome of arbitrageurs behaving in a certain way. Understanding arbitrageur behaviors will help us 
understand why markets increase or decrease in efficiency over time. Secondly, theoretical predictions, 
with respect to arbitrageur specialization, have not, to our knowledge, been empirically tested for a lack 
of transaction-level data at the level of the arbitrageur. The dimensions along which arbitrageurs 




these help inform long-held theoretical beliefs about arbitrageur behavior. Finally, the most recent 
contributions in behavioral finance that pertain to adaptive markets hypothesis have provided a 
framework to understand the evolutionary behaviors of all market actors. Testing the behavioral patterns 
of arbitrageurs in the context of spatial arbitrage will lend credibility to this recent theory. Understanding 
the antecedents influencing the evolution of specialization will provide a deeper understanding of 
arbitrageur behavior. 
In this paper, we identify arbitrageur specialization choices and find that the type of asset and 
sourcing location are two important yet independent specialization choices that arbitrageurs make. Our 
results indicate that both asset specialization and source location specialization affect arbitrage profits and 
arbitrage intensity (i.e., the number of vehicles arbitraged in a given period). We identify unique groups 
of arbitrageurs based on how vehicle and location specialization behaviors evolve over time. We further 
analyze the antecedents that cause changes in specialization using a system of equations that can help 
identify the causal link among antecedents, specialization, and arbitrage outcomes (i.e., profits and 
arbitrage intensity as measured by the number of vehicles arbitraged). We find that intensity of arbitrage, 
available capital, and percentage of vehicles sourced from remote locations using electronic channels 
affect how arbitrageurs alter their specialization strategies. 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows: In section 3.2 we discuss prior 
literature. In section 3.3 we develop the theory and state our main hypotheses. In section 3.4 we describe 
the empirical context and test our main hypotheses. In section 3.5 we conclude and state limitations of 
this study. 
3.2 Literature review 
 
Our paper extends two streams of research: a) the literature on behavioral finance, the literature 
on limits of arbitrage, and the literature on adaptive markets hypothesis, and b) the literature on spatial 




3.2.1 Prior research on the limits of arbitrage 
 
The efficient markets hypothesis stream of literature is one of the earliest streams of financial 
research and investment theory. The efficient markets hypothesis states that markets fully, accurately, and 
instantaneously incorporate all available information into market prices (Fama 1970, 1998). Though most 
research pertaining to efficient markets hypothesis focuses on financial instruments such as stocks, 
currency, or commodities, several scholars have looked at the effect of efficient markets hypothesis on 
products whose prices move based on available information. For example, prior research has tested the 
efficient markets hypothesis in the context of physical products in, for example, agricultural markets 
(Baffes 1991, Mackenzie and Holt 2002) and single family homes (Case and Shiller 1988). We develop 
the current paper in the context of the automobile market. 
The efficient markets hypothesis research stream assumes that traders are rational and update their 
beliefs as and when new information becomes available in markets (Barberis and Thaler 2003). It is 
possible that traders do not update their beliefs correctly as market conditions change and that traders 
need not be rational. These non-ideal behaviors give rise to opportunities for arbitrage, which are 
exploited by those traders seeking profits and those who are willing to track market inefficiencies to the 
extent that the inefficiencies can be exploited for economic profit. The argument put forth by the 
proponents of the efficient market hypothesis is that when arbitrage opportunities surface in markets, a 
large number of small traders will exploit these opportunities, thereby quickly returning markets to their 
original equilibrium state.  
The behavioral finance literature originating in a paper by Shliefer and Vishny (1998) called “The 
Limits of Arbitrage” shows that the argument put forth by efficient markets hypothesis is flawed. In this 
paper Shleifer and Vishny define arbitrage as a specialized activity that only a few market actors with 
sophisticated knowledge would conduct. The main assessment of scholars following this stream of 




profits (Barberis and Thaler 2003, Shleifer 2000). In markets, arbitrage opportunities are plentiful and 
continue to exist despite the role of arbitrageurs (Shleifer 2000). However, as regular traders recognize 
these opportunities, they gradually buy into such, thus reducing opportunities for trade of arbitrageurs and 
increasing the risk for arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs, being specialists in markets, also cannot alter their 
profit-making strategies fast enough to retain profitability. Capitalists (or investors) from whom 
arbitrageurs borrow capital withdraw capital available to arbitrageurs. This makes it difficult for 
arbitrageurs to further engage in trade when regular traders impinge on arbitrage opportunities. Thus, 
available capital for arbitrage determines the extent to which arbitrageurs are able to exploit opportunities 
in markets. We test capital availability in the current paper and study how the availability of capital 
affects both arbitrage profits and arbitrage intensity, which is a measure of how well arbitrageurs engage 
in markets. 
Several papers have independently tested the predictions put forth by behavioral finance theory in the 
light of capital limitations, information limitations, and various types of risks faced by arbitrageurs. Some 
papers have identified and  tested for different types of risks faced by arbitrageurs in financial markets 
(Gabaix et al. 2007, Mitchell and Pulvino 2001) and have ascertained that these risks indeed inhibit the 
ability of arbitrageurs. Similarly, scholars have tested and challenged capital limitations faced by 
arbitrageurs and have found that capital limitations, though exciting, can be avoided by various 
portfolio/trade choices made in the context of study (Hanson and Sunderam 2014, Hombert and Thesmar 
2014, Ljungqvist and Qian 2014).  Another stream of research shows how holding costs and transaction 
costs impede arbitrage (Pontiff 1996). As with the testing of efficient markets hypothesis in the context of 
product markets, spatial arbitrage has been related to behavioral finance and the limits of arbitrage 
literature by a few scholars, most notably those in the automobile sector (e.g., Overby and Clarke 2012).  
A limitation faced by arbitrageurs that is rarely studied empirically–but that is often cited by many 




diversification (Lintner 1965) for both long-term and short-term trades in order to reduce systemic and 
idiosyncratic risks to their profits, arbitrageurs prefer specialization as a strategy. There are two main 
reasons why specialization rather than diversification helps arbitrageurs. Firstly, specialization helps 
arbitrageurs gain and retain information with regards to profits earned while trading very specific assets. 
Given the fact that arbitrage is conducted within a short span of time (i.e., purchase and sale of the same 
asset almost instantaneously), profit uncertainty is reduced when arbitrageurs repeat the same pattern of 
purchase, especially when environmental conditions don’t change (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 
Mitchell and Pulvino 2001). Secondly, specialization helps an arbitrageur observe and differentiate his or 
her offerings from other arbitrageurs operating in markets, thereby avoiding competition and reducing 
risks to profits due to competition (Norton and Tenenbaum 1993).  
One of the key disadvantages to specialization, especially when specialization behaviors don’t 
change over time, is that specialization increases the arbitrageur’s exposure to idiosyncratic risk. 
Idiosyncratic risk is a form of profit risk arising in markets due to reasons such as demand/supply shocks 
or sudden changes in information pertaining to trade, the cause of which remains unknown to the 
arbitrageur. Given that arbitrageurs are risk-averse and profit-seeking traders, specialization could have a 
negative effect when such shocks happen. For example, fluctuations in demand/supply when regular 
traders recognize easy opportunities for profits would cause arbitrageurs to exit (Gabaix et al. 2007). 
Another slow but deliberate change could be the adoption of e-commerce in traditionally physical 
markets. Electronic commerce enables buyers and sellers to trade directly, disintermediating the 
arbitrageur, as shown in Chapter 2. However, the rollout of new technology can also increase the 
arbitrageur’s ability to identify newer arbitrage opportunities for sourcing, also demonstrated in Chapter 
2. 
Arbitrageurs, whose main motive is to retain risk-free profits, are known to reduce profit uncertainty 




assets and sourcing locations. We further test theoretical predictions with respect to specialization and 
study how specialization affects arbitrage profits and arbitrage intensity. 
3.2.2 Research on Adaptive Markets Hypothesis 
 
A more recent stream of literature that attempts to bridge the gap between the efficient markets 
hypothesis and the limits of arbitrage is the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (Lo 2004).  The adaptive 
markets hypothesis attempts to reconcile theories on the limits of arbitrage and theories pertaining to the 
efficient markets hypothesis by providing a framework set in the light of the theory of evolution. In this 
paper, Andrew Lo states the following:  
Efficient Markets Hypothesis supports market forces will always act to bring prices back to 
rational levels, implying that the impact of irrational behavior on financial markets is 
generally negligible, and therefore, irrelevant .But, this last conclusion relies on the 
assumption that market forces are sufficiently powerful to overcome any type of behavioral 
bias, or equivalently, that irrational beliefs are not so pervasive as to overwhelm the capacity 
of arbitrage capital dedicated to taking advantage of such irrationalities.. This is an 
empirical issue that cannot be settled theoretically, but must be tested through careful 
measurement and statistical analysis…. 
Adaptive markets hypothesis relies on the fact that markets never reach a state of equilibrium and 
that profit opportunities will abound in markets, despite the role of arbitrageurs (Grossman and Stiglitz, 
1980). When environmental changes occur either as a shock or gradually, arbitrage becomes risky. As a 
result, the arbitrageur is forced to alter behaviors in response to these environmental changes in order to 
remain profitable (Lo 2004, Lo 2005, Lo 2008)   
Just as environmental factors play a role in shaping arbitrageur behavior, the arbitrageur’s own 
personal preferences (called “behavioral biases”) are shaped by the arbitrageur’s assessment of market 




behavioral biases play an important role in determining how the arbitrageur responds to environmental 
changes in the market (Farmer 2002).  The adaptive markets hypothesis states the following with respect 
to the evolution of traders” 
While the former i.e. EMH may be viewed as the steady-state limit of a population with 
constant environmental conditions, the latter i.e. AMH involves specific adaptations of 
certain groups that may or may not persist, depending on the particular evolutionary paths 
that the economy experiences.... 
This prediction sets the groundwork for testing the existence of subgroups of traders who exhibit 
common behavioral changes over time. Recent papers in finance have tested the adaptive markets 
hypothesis in the context of foreign exchange markets (Neely et al. 2006) and stock markets (Kim et al. 
2011). However, these papers have used price movements to draw conclusions about behaviors and 
adaptations of traders. Price movements and variations are, in fact, byproducts of trade resulting from 
actions of regular traders and arbitrageurs. In the current paper, we use trader-level data along with asset-
level data over several time periods to analyze the behaviors of arbitrageurs. We group arbitrageurs based 
on their specialization and identify different groups of arbitrageurs based on specialization patterns with 
respect to vehicle specialization and location specialization. Further, we study antecedents that affect the 
evolution of arbitrageur specialization strategy.  
3.2.3 Literature in e-commerce, market efficiency, and spatial arbitrage 
 
The literature on e-commerce and markets is a widely cited stream in information systems, 
economics, and management. Scholars have used various contexts to study the effect of electronic trade 
on market efficiency. For example, scholars have compared brick-and-mortar stores and electronic 
commerce stores (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). Similarly, scholars have studied the effects of the 




(Overby and Clarke 2012, Overby and Forman 2014) on market efficiency. One of the reasons cited for 
markets getting more efficient is that e-commerce has made it easier for both sellers and buyers to find 
and trade with each other by reducing search costs. Scholars have studied the role of arbitrageurs in 
making markets more efficient, especially in the presence of electronic trading channels (Overby and 
Clarke 2012). Chapter 2 shows that as electronic trading is adopted in markets, spatial arbitrage (and 
arbitrage opportunities) is reduced. However, the arbitrageur’s ability to exploit opportunities increases 
over time. The effect of multiple electronic channels varies with respect to the channel features—namely, 
transaction immediacy and channel reach. Chapter 2 also shows that although overall arbitrage 
opportunities are reduced, arbitrageurs get more efficient at exploiting the remaining opportunities in 
markets. This idea is important to the current paper in which we study how sourcing via the electronic 
channels affects arbitrage profits.  We also analyze how sourcing using electronic channels affects change 
in arbitrageur specialization behavior over time. 
This paper’s novel contributions are summarized below. Prior studies have used dual listed 
companies (De Jong, Rosenthal, and Van Dijk, 2009; Froot and Dabora, 1999), foreign exchange markets 
(Neely, Weller, and Ulrich, 2009),  cross-listed shares (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010),  among others to 
indicate that arbitrageur limitations exist in markets. Each one of these studies has used price variations or 
inefficiencies exploited by arbitrageurs due to price variations in order to arrive at conclusions regarding 
arbitrage limitations. Price-based effects are, in fact, byproducts of trader behavior.  
In the current paper, because of the richness of data, we are able to study arbitrageur behaviors 
directly using identifiers for the arbitrageurs and goods being traded. Additionally, this paper studies and 
recognizes the effect of specialization on arbitrage outcomes and the effect of specialization behavior of 
arbitrageurs, which, to our knowledge, has not been empirically validated in prior literature. Another 
unique contribution of our paper is that by directly observing arbitrage activity in markets and identifying 




arbitrageurs in markets. This directly provides empirical evidence for the predictions in the adaptive 
markets hypothesis and shows how various antecedents affect the evolution of specialization behaviors in 
markets. These findings shed more light on arbitrage activity and empirically support the adaptive 
markets hypothesis. 
3.3 Theory and Hypotheses  
 
3.3.1 Arbitrage specialization  
 
Professional arbitrage is a specialized and risky activity that involves considerable capital. Hence, 
only a few specialized traders engage in arbitrage. Over time, these traders learn to specialize on the asset 
type and sourcing locations and thus become more efficient (Gabaix et al., 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Arbitrageur specialization over time occurs because of the need to reap higher profits by reducing 
profit uncertainty.  Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H1: Increased asset specialization and location specialization is positively correlated with arbitrage 
profits.  
3.3.2 Evolution of arbitrageur behavior: Effect of arbitrage intensity, e-commerce, and capital 
 
Scholars who support the limits of arbitrage hypothesis claim that arbitrageurs are limited in their 
ability to exploit arbitrage opportunities. Different groups of arbitrageurs specialize differently in 
response to changes in markets due to behavioral biases and environmental factors (Lo, 2004). 
Arbitrageurs can specialize on assets and the locations from which they source assets. Eventually, 
economic profits earned by arbitrageurs determine whether they can continue to operate in markets over 
the long term since economic profits are the only motive for arbitrageurs in markets. As seen from H1 
above, we see that increased specialization leads to increased profits, since arbitrageurs tend to reduce 




sourcing their assets from different locations or by sourcing different types of assets in order to remain 
profitable. Environmental changes do affect existing strategies of arbitrageurs, causing them to change 
their specialization over time.  Thus we hypothesize the following: 
H2: Arbitrageur specialization strategies with respect to asset type and sourcing locations change over 
time. 
Environmental changes such as the introduction of electronic commerce induce demand shocks, 
since they tend to increase the number of traders who can purchase the same good. This increase in 
demand affects equilibrium conditions in markets by moving prices away from their usual state, which the 
arbitrageur used to exploit for profits. As a result, arbitrageurs are forced to alter specialization strategies 
in response to such changes in order to remain profitable. As arbitrageurs increasingly engage in arbitrage 
in markets, they face various environmental changes, so they must evolve their strategies in order to attain 
a state of specialization, from which they can continue to trade with some level of certainty. More 
arbitrage leads to higher profits, provided that the specialization strategy is right.   
Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H3: Increased arbitrage activity is positively correlated with the asset specialization and is positively 
correlated with location specialization: Increased arbitrage activity is positively correlated with 
profitability of the arbitrageur. 
With electronic trading and the increased reach of electronic channels, arbitrageurs have 
increased access to asset types they specialize in from other locations. This increased reach, in some 
ways, offsets the reduction of opportunities caused by an increase in demand for the previously arbitraged 
good, as discussed above. From H1 above, we see that increased asset specialization is positively 




specialization, arbitrageurs can increasingly source assets they specialize in from remote locations, given 
that they have increased reach from electronic trading. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H4: Increased sourcing of vehicles from electronic trading channels is positively correlated with asset 
specialization and is negatively correlated with location specialization 
One of the important limitations of arbitrage is the access to capital for arbitrage (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). However, since an arbitrageur is a specialist by nature, increasing capital would mean that 
an arbitrageur can learn about newer vehicles without worrying about making profits. In other words, 
access to capital reduces the arbitrageur’s risk. Arbitrageurs with increased capital would increase their 
participation in the market in the hopes of earning more arbitrage profits. Thus, the easiest way to 
increase market participation is getting to a state of higher specialization by increasing their arbitrage 
activity and finding the right strategy. Thus, increased capital causes an arbitrageur to be more specialized 
because it increases his or her market participation. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H5: Increased capital availability is positively correlated with intensity of arbitrage and with both asset 
specialization and location specialization. 
We proceed to test our hypothesis using the empirical context below. 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
 
Our empirical context is the wholesale auto auction market. This market is geographically 
distributed across 80+ locations in the continental United States. An auction intermediary maintains these 
facilities. In this market buyers and sellers trade vehicles in auctions organized by the intermediary in the 
English auction format. Buyers are mostly wholesale automobile dealers. Sellers are either dealers or 
large enterprise traders, such as automobile rental companies or finance companies.  
Each auction facility where vehicles are auctioned has multiple auction lanes numbered 




solicits bids. The highest bidder wins the auction once the seller accepts the bidding price. Beginning in 
2003, the auction intermediary started enabling remote auctions by installing video recording and voice 
equipment on physical lanes. This enabled remote buyers to submit bids from their computer terminals 
instead of physically being present at the facility. Also, the auction intermediary started selling vehicles 
using a standalone electronic market similar to eBay.com in 2005. Buyers could submit bids on vehicles 
and purchase vehicles through the website, and sellers could choose to list their vehicles on the website. 
Thus, there were mainly two modes of purchase: the physical mode where buyers and sellers were 
physically present at the auction and the electronic mode where the buyer purchased a vehicle either in 
competition with regular bidders through webcast or via the standalone electronic market. Our dataset has 
unique identifiers for buyers, sellers, goods traded, price, and sale date. The dataset is described in  
Chapter 2, Table 2.3. There were a total of 40,657,724 transactions in this market between 2003 and 2010 
and 201,275 unique traders who purchase these vehicles between 2003 and 2010. 
3.4.1 Spatial arbitrage  
 
Following Overby and Clarke (2010), we define flips as those pairs of transactions in which the 
buyer i in the first transaction purchases a vehicle with VIN v  at location  j on date d and sells the same 
vehicle with VIN v at a location k on date e. We classify those flips as spatial arbitrage when the 
difference between the purchase date d and sale date e is α = 7 days and the locations j and k are different.  
3.4.1.2 Trader as an arbitrageur and delineating a subset of arbitrageurs for our study 
Just as financial market traders use arbitrage as part of their profit-making strategy, arbitrageurs 
in the market for automobiles use spatial arbitrage as a profit making strategy.  Thus, for most traders 
spatial arbitrage plays a dual role in this market. Firstly, they purchase vehicles for sale in their 
dealerships. Secondly, traders arbitrage a subset of vehicles. Arbitrage in itself involves considerable 
effort—though the returns are immediate and, if properly strategized, risk free. This is because 




right price at a t- α days, considering that they sell the vehicle on day t. Then, the arbitrageur has to 
transport the vehicle to another location within a short interval of time (e.g., possibly on the day of sale or 
the day following the sale). The transportation cost should be such that it doesn’t reduce his or her profits 
too much. Finally, the arbitrageur has to sell the vehicle at another auction facility that might be far away. 
The arbitrageur also has to sell the vehicle at a price that gives him or her an acceptable level of profit. 
Each of these activities comes with a certain amount of uncertainty or unforeseen risk, which affects his 
or her overall profit risk. For example, a transportation delay would hold up capital and increase risk with 
respect to liquidity. Similarly, if the destination facility does not auction the vehicle within the given time, 
the arbitrageur would again increase the cost to capital by increasing the risk to his liquidity. If there is a 
sudden increase in supply of vehicles of the type the arbitrageur intends to sell at the location, the 
arbitrageur may be unable to sell the vehicle at a profitable price. Various types of uncertainties are 
introduced over the entire arbitrage transaction—the purchase of the vehicle, transportation, and the sale 
of the vehicle. The uncertainty introduced at each stage of the arbitrage process is in itself large enough to 
make spatial arbitrage unattractive for the regular dealer. The regular dealer is knowledgeable about his 
customer who comes to the dealer’s lot to purchase a particular vehicle type, and most dealers would be 
satisfied by this opportunity. This is one of the reasons why only a few select traders engage in arbitrage 
in markets.   
Next, we differentiate arbitrageurs from regular traders based on a few criterion, as stated below. 
Firstly, we have to differentiate arbitrageurs from regular traders because all arbitrageurs are also dealers. 
Arbitrageurs have two roles: that of a regular trader and that of an arbitrageur.  Secondly, we have to 
identify arbitrage activity as sizeable enough to conduct meaningful econometric analysis with sufficient 
cross-sectional variation.  
There are 13,195 traders who have flipped a total of 255,379 vehicles between 2003 and 2010 at 




Thus, in order to differentiate a regular dealer from an arbitrageur, we do the following:  Out of 13,195 
traders, 5,602 have flipped only a single vehicle in the entire eight-year period; 11,107 traders have 
flipped between 1 and 10 vehicles in the entire eight-year period; and 12,475 traders have flipped between 
10 and 50 vehicles in the entire period. In order to derive measures for vehicle specialization and source 
location specialization, we would need at least 3 vehicles per year from the sample. Furthermore, 720 of 
these traders have arbitraged at least 51 cars between 2003 and 2010, and we can reliably use these 
traders and their transactions as the focal dataset for our analysis. These sets of transactions constitute 
1,95,634 arbitrage transactions or ~80% of all transactions we classify as spatial arbitrages in the market. 
This threshold is a reasonable assumption for studying arbitrageur behaviors for the following reasons. 
Firstly, as described above, spatial arbitrage involves considerable effort in order to be profitable. 
Arbitrageurs who arbitrage at least 50 vehicles would have either understood the nuances of arbitrage by 
handling all the uncertainties concerning purchase, transportation, and sale of the vehicle. They would 
either be engaging in arbitrage by successfully earning their desired level of profits or would have 
recognized that they are unable to make profits and would be in the process of winding up their arbitrage 
operations. Either way, arbitrageurs who are present in this subsample meet two conditions: that of 
deliberately engaging in arbitrage by specializing and that of being aware of market conditions affecting 
their profits. 
3.4.2 Testing H1: The effect of specialization on arbitrage profits  
 
3.4.2.1 Arbitrageur specialization 
Prior literature in strategy, economics, and information systems has used statistical measures for 
indicating concentration. These concentration measures are used to indicate the size distribution of 
entities when multiple entities are present. For example, the market share of a particular firm’s products 
amongst a group of firms that sell similar products is indicted by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 




Prior research has shown that concentration plays an important role in various market studies (Curry and 
George, 1983). Research has shown that concentrations affect market power, business behavior, firm 
performance, and factors such as GDP, trade imbalance, etc., at the macro-level.  In our research context, 
we use a Gini coefficient of the arbitrageur’s preference for J. D. Power and Associates vehicle 
categorization24 type to indicate vehicle specialization. We use a Gini coefficient to indicate an 
arbitrageur’s preference for vehicle’s make to test for robustness. Similarly, we use a Gini coefficient to 
indicate the location specialization, or the choice distribution of arbitrageurs with respect to source 
locations during a year. Both of these measures are calculated in the context of vehicles that are arbitraged 
in the market and meet our definitions for arbitrage.  In addition to the Gini coefficient to indicate vehicle 
specialization and a Gini coefficient to indicate source location specialization, we also use the Theil index 
as an additional robustness metric.  Figure 3.1(a) below illustrates the two strategies of arbitrageur profits. 
Arbitrageurs could specialize in sourcing locations and vehicle types, as illustrated below. 
 
 





                                                          
24 J D Power & associates is a world renowned marketing firm that conducts surveys on car and vehicle qualities. J 
D Power & associates categorize vehicles based on body types as SUV, Sedan, Truck, Convertible, Coupe, Wagon, 
Van, Crossover or Hatchback. Another categorization of vehicles in our sample is to use vehicle makes which 
include Ford, Acura, Fiat, Kia, Nissan, Suzuki, Toyota, Chevrolet, etc.. Our key results are robust to both types. 
Figure 3.1.  This figure depicts two different arbitrageur strategies. 
 
a. Arbitrageur specializes on vehicles but not 
on locations. He or she buys the same kind of 
vehicle from multiple locations. 
b. Arbitrageur specializes in location but not 
on vehicles. He or she buys different types 





3.4.2.2 Arbitrage Profits  
Arbitrage profits are calculated, as described in Table 3.1 below. 
Figure 3.2 below shows how mean arbitrage profits and arbitrage count vary over time. The mean 
arbitrage profits are adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index for the corresponding year. We 
observe that while the mean arbitrage profits fluctuate, the arbitrage count declines over time. The first 
dependent variable (the mean arbitrage profit of the arbitrageur per year) can be used to determine the 
effectiveness of the arbitrageur in the market.  This corresponds to Fig 3.2 (a). However, the mean profits 
per vehicle are in themselves insufficient to study arbitrage behavior. Consider an arbitrageur who makes 
$2,000 in arbitrage profits per vehicle. This arbitrageur is more effective than one who makes $2,000 
profit by arbitraging 10 vehicles.  Therefore, it is important to study antecedents that influence the number 
of vehicles arbitraged, or arbitrage intensity in the market. The number of vehicles arbitraged also 
indicates whether the arbitrageur has been able to exploit inefficiencies in the market, as well as whether 
the arbitrageur has been able to adapt his or her behavior to arrive at the right strategy for the market.  The 
change of arbitrage intensity over time is depicted in Fig 3.2 (b) below.  
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As noted above, we identify 720 arbitrageurs who have arbitraged at least 50 vehicles over 
eightyears between 2003 and 2010. We constructed a two-dimensional panel of observations for each 
arbitrageur i during year t. We tested the effect of vehicle specialization and source location specialization 
on mean arbitrage profits earned by the arbitrageur. We note that VehicleSpecializationit and 
LocationSpecializationit affect the mean arbitrage profit per vehicle and are the focal independent 
variables. The limits of arbitrage theory suggest that capital limitations affect arbitrage activity. Hence, 
we include the mean capital available to the arbitrageur (CapitalWkit) as a proxy to measure the capital 
that is available to the arbitrageur in a given period. Note that this measure is neither accurate nor 
complete, since we do not know the amount of capital accessible to the arbitrageur at any point in time. 
Given the fact that in our definition of arbitrage, we use 7 days to indicate a flip; we assume that the mean 
rollover time for each vehicle being arbitraged (or sold) from a dealer’s lot is 7 days. This means that the 
average capital available to the arbitrageur is equivalent to the total capital spent on purchasing vehicles 
from the market in a particular week25. We calculate the total number of arbitrage opportunities available 
within a radius of 500 miles from the arbitrageur (totalOpportunities500it). Chapter 2, section 2.5.2 
discusses how the number of opportunities is derived. This variable is used as an indicator of 
opportunities in the market of which the arbitrageur should be aware. These data are not available to the 
arbitrageur as he or she does not have visibility into all trades happening at a given point in time. The 
arbitrageur also cannot calculate the profits ex-ante, if such transactions were to happen. We assume that 
                                                          
25 The total capital available to a dealer can be thought of as the total Cash in Hand + Credit accessible + Value 
realized from Used Car Inventory Turnover at any point in time. It is difficult to estimate cash in Hand or Credit 
accessible to the dealer. These depend on a variety of factors including size of the dealership, size of the business 
etc. However,  we can use CapitalWk as a proxy for Used Car inventory turnover. Used Car Inventory turnover 
varies by dealer, location and time of year for sale. The general consensus amongst all dealers is that vehicles have 
to sell within 30 days (http://www.vauto.com/dealer-resources/managing-used-age/avoid-used-vehicle-inventory-
age-problems/). However, this cannot be assumed true. Inventory turnover would potentially be difficult to 
calculate and this measure can be improved in further versions of the paper. We currently use CapitalMonth and 
CapitalYear to indicate the total capital spent by the arbitrageur in the market to purchase vehicles which are also 
proxies. The MaxCapitalWk, indicating maximum capital available to the arbitrageur, is also calculated but is 




arbitrageurs who are aware of the market’s operation will use this information to increase their trade, and, 
hence, we include this variable in the model. We include (VehicleMileageit or VehicleValuationit) as these 
variables control for the value of the car. The higher the value of the vehicle, the higher the risk to the 
arbitrageur and possibly higher the profit possibility per vehicle It is also possible that more expensive 
vehicles bring in less profit due to limited demand. Electronic commerce is a major component of the 
market, providing significantly increased reach for an arbitrageur. In some ways sourcing via e-commerce 
enables arbitrageurs to shift their demand to locations where they can find a matching vehicle in the 
expected price range. The percentage of vehicles sourced from the e-commerce channel 
(pctArbitragedeChannelit) indicates the extent to which mean arbitrage profits are affected by sourcing 
from e-commerce channels.  The proportion of vehicles (ProportionArbitragediti) arbitraged by an 
arbitrageur indicates the extent to which arbitrage is considered an important constituent of the 
arbitrageur’s overall strategy for arbitrage. γt is used to indicate the time fixed effects. α is the intercept 
and Ui  is used to indicate user level fixed effects. 
Our two-dimensional panel model to test H1 is specified below and descriptive statistics of key 
variables are discussed in Table 3.1 below. 
MeanArbitrageProfitit = α + Ui +  β1VehicleSpecializationit   + β2LocationSpecializationit + 
β3CapitalWkit + β4NumVehiclesPurchasedit  + β5 MeanVehicleMileageit + β6 totalOpportunities500it  + β7 













Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of key variables 
Variable Name Description Descriptive statistics  
Mean (stdev) Min,max 
meanArbitrageProfitita Mean arbitrage profit per vehicle of arbitrageur i in year t  
divided by 10000.(This profit is adjusted for inflation 
using the consumer price index http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). 
Profits for each transaction are calculated as follows: 
ArbitrageProfit = salePriceatDestination - 
salePriceatSource – BuyerFees – SellerFees – 
transportationFees. Transportation fees are calculated as 
described in Appendix A.  
0.069 (0.04) -0.234, .699 
VehicleSpecializationitb Mean Gini coefficient indicating specialization of the 
arbitrageur i with respect to vehicle power type in year t 
for the arbitrgeud vehicles 
0.329 (0.199) 0, 0.80 
LocationSpecializationit Mean Gini coefficient indicating specialization of the 
arbitrageur i with respect to source auction locations in 
year t for the arbitraged vehicles. 
0.265 (0.208) 0, 0.83 
NumVehiclesPurchasedit Count of vehicles purchased by arbitrageur i divided by 




NumArbitragedit Count of vehicles arbitraged by the arbitrageur i in year t. 46.92(113.1) 1, 2771 
proportionArbitrageit Proportion of vehicles arbitraged by arbitrageur i in year t. 0.136 (0.12) .0003,1 
pctArbitragedeChannelit Proportion of vehicles that were arbitraged, which were 
sourced on the electronic channel (i.e. either webcast or 
standalone electronic market) by arbitrageur i in year t. 
0.040 (0.148) 0,1 
meanVehicleMileageit Mean mileage of all vehicles purchased by arbitrageur i 
divided by 10000 in year t. 
6.52 (3.01) 1.27, 7.71 
totalVehiclesAccess500itc Count of vehicles accessible to arbitrageur i within a 
radius of 500 miles divided by 10000 in year t 
107.7 (48.13) 7.90, 233.3 
totalOpportunities500itd Count of opportunities for arbitrage  within 500 miles of 
arbitrageur i in year t divided by 10000 
58.09 (37.96) 1.70, 204.90 
pcteAccess500ite Count vehicles accessible on the electronic channels to 
arbitrageur i within a radius of 500 miles divided by 10000 
in year t. 
0.819 (0.22) 0.177,1 
CapitalWkitf Capital available to the arbitrageur i during year t divided 
by 10000. 
(This is calculated as the mean capital spent spent during a 
particular week by the arbitrageur i in a particular year t). 
7.42 (9.79) 0.130, 
165.92 
a,b – This measure is tested for Gini (as well), and is tested with Power type as well 
C,d,e – similar measures are created for a radius of 250 miles, 200 miles. Results are found to be robust 
f- This measure is created for capital available in a year, capital available in a month, and the maximum capital available for 

















Time Fixed Effects Included 
User level Fixed Effects       Included 
Constant  0.0741***(0.0092) 
N 4000 
R2 0.601 
adj. R2 0.511 
F-stat 8.2679 
Degree Free. Min 16.0000 
Degree Free. R 3264.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 ) 
(MeanArbitrageProfit is adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index, as noted above) 
 
From the above results, we see that the vehicle specialization and auction specialization play 
important roles in determining both intensity and volume of arbitrage. We further estimate that a single 
standard deviation increase in vehicle specialization increases the mean arbitrage profit earned by the 
arbitrageur by 4.13 % (or $28.7). Similarly, a single standard deviation increase in auction specialization 
increases mean arbitrage profits by 2.44% (or $17). Similarly, if the capital accessible to the arbitrageur is 
increased by one standard deviation (i.e., $97900), we find that the mean arbitrage profits are not affected. 
Also, a single standard deviation increase in number of vehicles sourced using the electronic channels 
would increase the mean profits by 3.5% (or ~$25). This means that the arbitrageur is more likely to 
source cheaper vehicles from remote locations using the electronic channels, which would increase the 
profits. Another interesting effect is that of mean vehicle mileage. An increase of one standard deviation 
of vehicle mileage reduces mean profits by 16% (or $117). An increase of one standard deviation in the 
total number of cars purchased increases the number of vehicles arbitraged by 1,122% (or 57 vehicles). 
Our results indicate that H1 is supported. Specialization affects arbitrage profitability. We test for 




3.4.2.2 Tests for Robustness 
For robustness, we use the random effects model to test whether the results vary given random 
effects for the arbitrageur (Refer Table C1 in Appendix C for results). The Hausman tests for model 1 
finds no systematic differences (2 (15) = 31.09, p > 0.01) between fixed effects (which are always 
consistent but efficient) and random effects estimates (which are consistent but may be inefficient), which 
proves that the results do not change. In addition, to test for the variations in measurements, we alter the 
measurement of specialization to the Theil Index and show that these results hold true even with the Theil 
index (Ref Table C3 in Appendix C for results). We use vehicle makes instead of the J.D. Power and 
Associates vehicle category for vehicle specialization. The results are consistent with the vehicle makes 
as well (Ref. Table C2 in Appendix C for results). 
3.4.3 Testing H2: Arbitrageur Specializations evolve over a period of time 
 
We plot the set of 720 arbitrageurs based on their overall specializations for the time period of 
our study (2003 – 2010). Figure 3.3 below depicts these 720 arbitrageurs split into 3 groups, or terciles, 
based on the number of vehicles arbitraged. We see that the greater the number of vehicles arbitraged (or 
the higher the intensity of arbitrage), the higher the specialization will be on both dimensions. For high 
volume arbitrageurs, the vehicle specialization is higher than that of the low volume arbitrageurs. 
Similarly, for the higher volume arbitrageurs, location specialization is higher than location specialization 










Figure 3.3: Arbitrageurs are divided into terciles (3 groups) based on the count of vehicles 
arbitraged between 2003 and 2010. The specializations are axis of VehicleSpecialization (Y-axis) 
vs LocationSpecialization (X-axis). 
 
Table 3.3 Describing the distribution of terciles amongst the quadrants 
above 
Total = 720 Count Count Count Count 
















 (bottom 33rd ercentile ) 
108 43 48 42 
Tercile 2  
(33rd  to 66th percentile )   
52 59 69 59 
Tercile 3 
(Top 33rd  percentile) 
25 30 71 114 
 
We see that a considerable number of arbitrageurs specialize in both dimensions in tercile 3, 
indicating that the high volume arbitrageurs are mostly specialists, or that arbitrageurs who engage in a 
large number of arbitrages specialize more. In the next section we examine how arbitrageurs evolve, and 






























3.4.3.1 Arbitrageur Evolution  
In order to examine how arbitrageur specialization strategy evolves over time, we first classify 
arbitrageurs based on how LocationSpecialization and VehicleSpecialization change over time. For each 
arbitrageur i  during year t, we construct a Gini coefficient that is indicative of vehicle specialization. This 
indicates an arbitrageur’s preference for vehicles belonging to a particular J.D. Power and Associates 
category (VehicleSpecializationit). Similarly, for each period t, we construct a Gini coefficient that 
indicates the distribution of source locations from which arbitrageur i sourced vehicles 
(LocationSpecializationit)26.  Our panel consists of 4,000 observations with these two specialization 
variables (i.e., VehicleSpecializationit and LocationSpecializationit), where t indicates the time periods and 
i indicates unique vehicle identifiers. Off these 720 arbitrageurs, only 96 arbitrageurs engage in arbitrage 
for all eightyears of our study. Thus, because of the missing values, using a clustering algorithm such as 
k-means or Ward’s hierarchical clustering algorithm to determine groups of arbitrageurs based on the 
specialization variables would reduce the clustered dataset27 significantly. In order to overcome this 
limitation, we use the slopes of specialization indicators (i.e. VehicleSpecializationit and 
LocationSpecializationit) to construct categories of arbitrageurs.  We use the models 
VehicleSpecializationit = α + β0i. (t – 2000) and LocationSpecializationit = α + β1i.(t – 2000) to obtain the 
slope coefficients (i.e. β0i and β1i) for each arbitrageur i. This will enable us to classify arbitrageurs based 
on the directionality of change in specialization over time. If β0i is positive (negative), then the arbitrageur 
i   became more (less) specialized with respect to vehicles. Similarly, if β1i is positive (negative), then 
arbitrageur i became more (less) specialized over time with respect to sourcing locations. We divide the 
arbitrageur population into three groups (terciles): G1,G2 and G3 based on β0i i.e. slope of 
VehicleSpecialization. Next, we divide the arbitrageur population into three groups (terciles): L1, L2 and 
                                                          
26 Vehicle specialization is indicated mainly by the specialization based on the power of the vehicle. Similarly, to 
test for robustness we also use the Vehicle Make e.g. Ford to indicate specialization. 




L3 based on β1i i.e. slope of LocationSpecialization. We then construct 9 unique groups based on two 
different tercile sets: G1, G2, G3 and  L1, L2, L3. Each arbitrageur belonging to a group belongs to one of 
the groups G1, G2 and G3 and to one of the groups L1, L2 and L3. These 9 groups uniquely identify 
different evolution patterns exhibited by arbitrageurs with respect to their specialization(s). The mean 
values of VehicleSpecializationit and LocationSpecializationit by year are plotted in Figure 3.4 below for 
each of the 9 groups. A discussion using the k-means clustering algorithm is presented in Appendix D. 
We also discuss the usage of better-fit equations of the second orde to derive these groups using 
clustering algorithms.  
 
   
Group 1: Arbitrageurs become 
less specialized with respect to 
both vehicles and source 
locations. N = 148 
Group 2: Arbitrageurs become 
less specialized with respect to 
vehicles but remain low 
specialists with respect to source 
locations. N = 53 
Group 3:Arbitrageurs 
belonging to this group 
become more specialized 
with respect to source 
locations and become less 
specialized with respect to 
vehicles. N = 34 
   
Group 4:  Arbitrageurs become 
less specialized with respect to 
source locations, while remaining 
high vehicle specialists. N= 53 
Group 5: arbitrageurs do not 
change their specializations. 
N=123 
Group 6: Arbitrageurs 
increase  source location 
specialization but remain low 





Figure 3.4: Groups of Arbitrageurs describing the evolution of arbitrageur specialization in time. The 
dark line indicates mean VehicleSpecialization in year t. The dotted line indicates LocationSpecialization 
in year t. 
 
In order to test for robustness in these patterns, we keep only 394 arbitrageurs who have 
arbitraged vehicles in at least 6 years out of eight(between 2003 and 2010). Thus, H2 is supported. 
Arbitrageur specialization behavior changes over time and in different ways. This result is important in 
the light of the prior literature on limits of arbitrage and efficient markets hypothesis. Firstly, the efficient 
markets hypothesis states that when markets become inefficient, multiple traders quickly consume these 
inefficiencies. The behavioral finance scholars differ in that they claim that only a few specialized traders 
would engage in arbitrage, and they are limited. We see from our results above that only 720 traders out 
of 12,196 actually engage in arbitrage, which confirms the predictions of behavioral finance. These 
groups confirm that are also specialists in the sense that their specialization affects profits and arbitrage 
intensity. Secondly, these 720 arbitrageurs show different behaviors as predicted in the Adaptive Markets 
Hypothesis since several arbitrageurs exhibit common patterns of evolution.  
From Figure 3.4 above, we see that arbitrageur strategies are neither constant nor uniform, but 
that they evolve in very specific ways in markets. In the next section we address the following question: 
What factors affect specialization? We test for antecedents that alter an arbitrageur’s strategy over time. 
 
  
Group 7: These arbitrageurs 
remain constantly high on vehicle 
specialization, but become 
increasingly less specialized on 
auction specialization. N = 34 
Group 8: These arbitrageurs 
become high vehicle specialists, 
but remain low location 
specialists. 
N=58 
Group 9:  These arbitrageurs 
become increasingly 
specialized on both the 





From the above groupings of arbitrageurs based on the directionality of the evolution of their 
specializations, we see that arbitrageur groups can either increase or decrease their specializations in both 
dimensions. 
3.4.4 Testing H3, H4 and H5:  Antecedents influencing arbitrageur strategy  
 
From  H2, we recognize that arbitrageurs specialize over time in both the vehicle type and 
sourcing location.28. There are two problems when we analyze this: Both VehicleSpecialization and 
LocationSpecialization are endogenous to NumArbitraged, because factors that affect the intensity of 
arbitrage also affect the change of specialization, and vice-versa. Both Specialization and NumArbitraged 
could be changing together introducing simultaneity bias. Since MeanArbitrageProfit is influenced by 
NumArbitraged and the specialization variables, we model arbitrage outcomes as a system of equations 
shown below, and instrument LocationSpecialization and VehicleSpecialization. The 4 models that 
describe our system are shown below. We further use a 3-Stage least squares estimator to obtain the 
effects of specialization on arbitrage outcomes. This accounts for the simultaneity bias and endogenity 
with respect to specialization and the outcomes of arbitrage. 
i.MeanArbitrageProfitsit=f(ProportionArbitrageit,VehicleSpecializationit,LocationSpecialization,Profitcon
trolsit)  
ii.NumArbitragedit = f (VehicleSpecializationit, LocationSpecializationit, Countcontrolsit) 
 
The specialization variables LocationSpecialization and VehicleSpecialization  are defined as follows: 
iii.VehicleSpecializationit= f (ProportionArbitrageit,, OverallVehicleSpecializationit, Vehiclecontrolsit) 
iv. LocationSpecializationit= f (ProportionArbitrageit,,OverallLocationSpecializationit,,Locationcontrolsit) 
The econometric specifications are four fixed effects models as follows: 
MeanArbitrageProfitit = α + Ui + β1VehicleSpecializationit   + β2LocationSpecializationit + β3CapitalWkit + 
β4NumVehiclesPurchasedit  + β5 MeanVehicleMileageit + β6 totalOpportunities500it  + β7 pcteAccess500it 
+ β8proprotionArbitrageit  + β9pctArbitragedeChannelit  + γt+ Єit  --(1) 
                                                          
28 An Alternative method to test the evolution of specialization using state-based transitions is described in 
Appendix F below. This method though robust discretizes the continuous variables for specialization. It is also 




NumArbitragedit = α + Ui + β1VehicleSpecializationit   + β2LocationSpecializationit + β3CapitalWkit + 
β4NumVehiclesPurchasedit + β5 MeanVehicleMileageit + β6 totalOpportunities500it + β7 pcteAccess500it + 
γt + Єit  --(2) 
 VehicleSpecializationit = α + Ui+ β1OverallVehicleSpecializationit  + β2 proprotionArbitrageit + 
β3CapitalWkit + β4NumVehiclesPurchasedit  + β5 MeanVehicleValuationit + β6totalVehiclesAccess500it + 
β7 pcteAccess500it +   β8pctArbitragedeChannelit  + γt + Єit  -- (3) 
 LocationSpecializationit =  α + Ui + β1OverallLocationSpecializationit   + β2proprotionArbitrageit + 
β3CapitalWkit +   β4 totalVehiclesAccess500it + β5 pcteAccess500it +   β6 pctArbitragedeChannelit  + β7 
cntAuction500i + γt + Єit ---(4) 
Based on the above specifications, we have two systems of equations based on the focal 
dependent variables indicating arbitrage outcomes (MeanArbitrageProfit and NumArbitraged).  They are 
(1,3,4) and (2,3,4). We apply 3SLS for these sets of equations. 
Model (1) is the same as the one described in section 3.4.2. Model (2) depicts variables correlated 
with the number of arbitraged vehicles. Model (3) depicts independent variables correlated with 
VehicleSpecialization and Model (4) depicts variables correlated with LocationSpecialization.  We 











Figure 3.5 Diagram indicating system dependence between Specialization, Controls and Arbitrage 
outcomes. The path 1.x indicates the system of equations 1,3,4 and the path 2.x indicates the system of 
equations 2,3,4 
      Arbitrage Outcomes  
 (1.iv)Mean arbitrage 
profits. 
(1.ii)  Arbitrage 
Specialization 










(2.iv)Count of arbitraged 
vehicles. 




3.4.4.1 Instrument:  As mentioned in section 3.2.4, every arbitrageur is also a dealer. Arbitrageurs also 
purchase vehicles to their dealer lot, which are not arbitraged. From table 3.1 we see that the mean of 
proportionArbitrage is 0.13 and the standard deviation is 0.12, which shows that most arbitrageurs 
arbitrage less than 15% of their total inventory. (There is also only 1 arbitrageur amongst 720 who has 
arbitraged 100% of his inventory of 5 vehicles in a particular year.) Thus, the choice of vehicles for 
arbitrage might depend on the arbitrageur’s overall choice preferences. We believe that the overall 
behavior (specialization) of the arbitrageur, calculated as the Gini coefficient of all vehicles purchased by 
an arbitrageur in a particular year (OverallVehicleSpecialization), and the Gini coefficient of all source 
locations visited by the arbitrageur in a particular year, indicated by 
(OverallSourceLocationSpecialization), affects the arbitrageur’s specialization variables with respect to  
vehicles arbitraged. The OverallVehicleSpecialization variable affects the vehicleSpecialization for those 
vehicles that are arbitraged, and the specialization with respect to vehicles that are not arbitraged. 
Similarly, the OverallLocationSpecialization variable affects the location specialization for those vehicles 
that are arbitraged, and those that are not arbitraged.  These two variables can be thought to be indicators 
of the overall location strategy of the arbitrageur influencing the arbitrageur’s LocationSpecialization with 
respect to arbitrage. We note that the arbitrage behavior of an arbitrageur depends on the overall behavior 
of the arbitrageur and his or her strategy is significantly affected by biases he or she exhibits while 
purchasing vehicles for his lot. For example, a Ford dealer would most likely purchase Ford SUVs as 
opposed to Toyota SUVs or GM’s SUVs for the dealership. (He or she is also most likely to arbitrage 
Ford SUVs since s/he knows the market very well.) Thus, we claim that an arbitrageur’s overall strategy 
influences arbitrage strategy, which in turn influences the profits earned in the market.  Similarly, the 
overall behavior (of specialization) does not affect the arbitrageur’s mean profits or the number of 




indicators for vehicles and source locations for all vehicles purchased by an arbitrageur in a given year as 
the key instrumental variables. 
OverallVehicleSpecializationl and OverallLocationSpecialization affect VehicleSpecialization and 
LocationSpecialization, but do not affect the MeanArbitragedProfit or NumArbitraged, which are 
dependent only on the vehicles sold. This is because both meanArbitrageProfit and NumArbitraged are 
affected only by the sale of vehicles purchased for arbitrage (i.e., VehicleSpecializaiton). The summary 
statistics of the key variables are given below in Table 3.4. The rest of the variables are described in Table 
3.1.  
Table 3.4.  Descriptive Statistics of key instrument variables 
Variables  Description mean(SD) min (max) 
OverallVehicleSpecializationit mean Gini coefficient indicating 
specialization of the arbitrageur i with respect 
to vehicle power type in year t for all vehicles 
purchased in the year. 
0.25(0.254) 0(0.81) 
OverallLocationSpecializationit  mean Gini coefficient indicating 
specialization of arbitrageur i with respect to 
source locations in year t for all arbitraged 
vehicles. 
























Table 3.5 Results of the 3SLS regression 
Models (1,2,4) (2,3,4) 
Key Dependent Variables(Model i,ii) meanArbitrageProfit NumArbitraged 
VehicleSpecialization 0.0437*(0.0260) 182.9287***(27.6703) 
AuctionSpecialization 0.0390**(0.0197) 18.6377(30.0608) 
CapitalWk -0.0002(0.0002) 4.6164***(0.3433) 
NumCarsPurchased -0.0000(0.0000) 0.1214***(0.0072) 
proportionArbitrage -0.0527***(0.0196) - 
pctArbitragedeChannel 0.0164***(0.0054) - 
meanVehicleMileage -37.6251***(5.6419) 4736.9521(8632.8368) 
totalOppurtunities500 0.0001*(0.0000) -0.2130***(0.0661) 
pcteAccess500 0.0102(0.0211) -6.6477(39.2015) 
c.CapitalWk#c.pctArbitragedeChannel -0.0001(0.0003) -3.8364***(0.3976) 
Time specific Coefficients Included Included 
Arbitrageur specific Coefficients Included Included 
Intercept 0.0579***(0.0173) -69.6791**(30.8655) 
VehicleSpecialization (Model iii)   
proportionArbitrage 1.0015***(0.0278) 1.0522***(0.0271) 
OverallVehicleSpecialization 0.3270***(0.0305) 0.1959***(0.0250) 
pcteVehicles 0.0868(0.0629) - 
CapitalWk 0.0050***(0.0004) 0.0053***(0.0004) 
totalVehiclesAccess500 -0.0000(0.0006) 0.0003(0.0005) 
pcteAccess500 -0.0266(0.0965) -0.0206(0.0926) 
meanVehicleValuation 0.0000(0.0000) -0.0000(0.0000) 
Intercept for VehicleSpecialization 0.0369(0.0791) 0.0867(0.0762) 
Time specific Coefficients Included Included 
Arbitrageur specific Coefficients Included Included 
LocationSpecialization (Model iv)    
proportionArbitrage  0.8065***(0.0353) 0.8112***(0.0353) 
OverallLocationSpecialization 0.2091***(0.0176) 0.2169***(0.0175) 
pcteVehicles 0.0129(0.0798) 0.0278(0.0806) 
CapitalWk 0.0051***(0.0006) 0.0051***(0.0006) 
totalVehiclesAccess500 0.0006(0.0007) 0.0005(0.0007) 
pcteAccess500 -0.0046(0.1227) -0.0171(0.1230) 
cntAuction500 -0.0167**(0.0072) -0.0172***(0.0065) 
Intercept for LocationSpecialization 0.4235***(0.1320) 0.4327***(0.1258) 
Time specific Coefficients Included Included 
Arbitrageur specific Coefficients Included Included 
N 3977 3977 
R2 0.578 0.816 
Degree Free. min 725.0000 723.0000 
log-likelihood. 1.40e+04 -1.50e+04 
Chi-squared 5800.5377 1.75e+04 
Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
 
3.4.4.2 Interpretation of results 
 H3 is supported. For both VehicleSpecialization and LocationSpecialization, the proportionArbitraged 




the proportionArbitraged is positive and significant. What this shows is that intensity of arbitrage affects 
both the Specialization variables. If the proportionArbitraged increases by 1 standard deviation, then 
VehicleSpecialization increases by 36% - 39.5% or  between 0.12 – 0.14. Similarly, 
LocationSpecialization increases between 63% -66% or 0.16-0.18 Thus, as arbitrageurs increase their 
involvement in markets, by arbitraging more of their inventory in markets, they seemingly become more 
specialized. This finding is in sync with the theory that specialization helps arbitrageurs sustain 
profitability in markets and the general belief that arbitrageur specialization increases as arbitrageurs 
continue to engage in markets. 
H4 is NOT supported.  We see that the number of vehicles sourced from the electronic channels 
(or the number of vehicles available on the electronic channels within a radius of 500 miles) do not affect 
specialization in a significant way. However, the percentage of vehicles sourced from an electronic 
channel and later arbitraged affects arbitrage profits as explained above. This is because electronic trading 
channels provide increased transaction immediacy enabling arbitrageurs to locate vehicles priced 
optimally  Ref. Chapter 2). H5 is supported. As the amount of capital availability increases for arbitrage, 
arbitrageurs can fundamentally increase their involvement in markets without worrying about profits. 
However, if their main goal is to make profits, they tend to become more specialized as they increase their 
purchase in markets. A single standard deviation increase in capital available for arbitrage increases 
vehicleSpecialization by 15%, or 0.04. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in capital available for 
arbitrage increases the locationSpecialization by 18%, or 0.05. Thus, capital availability influences 
specializations positively. Capital also the intensity of arbitrage by increasing an arbitrageur’s 
participation in markets. This shows that capital availability is one of the most influential factors affecting 
arbitrage (both with respect to arbitrageur strategy and with respect to arbitrageur availability). 
Testing the Over-identification condition: We run the Sargan’s test (Lung-Fei 1992) to test for over-




(1,3,4) the Hansen-Sargan over-identification statistic is 249.562 and the χ2(10) = 0.000. This shows that 
the instruments are valid. However, for (2,3,4) the Hansen-Sargan over-identification statistic is 281.669 
and the  χ2(22) = 0.000. This shows that the instruments are valid. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
We study behaviors of arbitrageurs and test various predictions of the limits of arbitrage (see 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997) and the adaptive markets hypothesis (see Lo 2004) in the context of spatial 
arbitrage. Our analysis supports the assumption that specialization matters for arbitrageurs and influences 
the extent to which arbitrageurs make profits. We also show that specialization determines the intensity of 
arbitrage.   
To our knowledge, we are the first to study arbitrageur strategy with respect to sourcing 
specializations on two dimensions—asset specialization and source location specialization—by observing 
and identifying specific arbitrageur behaviors. We find that arbitrageur specialization on two 
dimensions—namely, asset type and sourcing locations matters in this market. 
Firstly, we show that arbitrageur specialization affects arbitrage profits and intensity (i.e., number 
of vehicles arbitraged).  Secondly, we show that many different types of specialization strategies exist in 
this market. We identify nine predominant strategies and the corresponding arbitrageurs who follow those 
strategies. This finding is in sync with the adaptive markets hypothesis, which predicts the presence of 
different groups of arbitrageurs, each with different behaviors in markets. We then analyze the 
antecedents that affect arbitrage strategy. We show that as arbitrageurs increase arbitrage activity in 
markets, they tend to become more specialized on both the source location and vehicle types.  While 
vehicles sourced on the electronic commerce channels influence profits positively, we are unable to find 
any effect of electronic trading (or access on electronic vehicles) on specialization. This is in sync with 
our earlier assumptions and conclusions in the limits of arbitrageur literature; our results show that capital 




Future work on this paper includes improving measures on capital availability by taking into 
account factors such as the 2008 depression and macro-economic factors in markets.  
3.5.1 Limitations and future research 
 
While our predictions and analysis test the limits of arbitrage theory and, to a certain extent, 
support predictions of the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, our scope is limited to “vehicles” and spatial 
arbitrage of “vehicles.”  That being said, the automobile market and the used automobile market in the 
United States forms a considerable proportion of the US GDP (approximately 4%) and is large enough to 
be studied on its own. Another limitation could be the measures of specialization. We chose the Gini 
coefficient (and test for robustness with the Thiel Index). However, almost all measures are extremely 
sensitive to the count of items in a distribution.  Antecedents could change under conditions when the 
goods traded are commodities other than vehicles. Future research opportunities could include testing our 
hypothesis with different good types or commodities such as food grains or heavy metals that are traded 






Chapter 4: CONCLUSION 
Spatial arbitrage and arbitrageurs are fundamental to markets since they enable matching supply and 
demand across locations, and, therefore by enabling convergence of prices across geography make 
markets efficient.(Barrett 2008, Takayama and Judge 1964). The two essays in this dissertation enhance 
our understanding about spatial arbitrage and arbitrageur sourcing behaviors.  
In the first essay, we make three key contributions. Firstly, we argue that spatial arbitrage is a 
measure of market efficiency and has several advantages over price dispersion. Secondly, we empirically 
examine the effect of two different modes of electronic commerce channels on spatial arbitrage. We show 
that channel features—namely, reach and transaction immediacy—affect the extent to which arbitrageurs 
are able to use the corresponding channel to exploit arbitrage opportunities. Finally, we document factors 
that determine the arbitrageur’s choice of source locations. Our main key finding is that the effect of 
electronic commerce is nuanced:  As markets get more efficient and spatial arbitrage (and arbitrage 
opportunities) is reduced, arbitrageurs also get better at exploiting inefficiencies that remain. 
We identify that the webcast channel that has high reach but no transaction immediacy results in a 
reduction of spatial arbitrage opportunities for the arbitrageur. However, the standalone electronic market 
that has high reach and high transaction immediacy increases the arbitrageur’s ability to identify and 
exploit such opportunities. Further, we analyze arbitrageur sourcing behaviors in markets and find various 
interesting facts about how arbitrageurs choose sourcing locations. We hope that the arguments regarding 
spatial arbitrage and market efficiency are convincing enough to make spatial arbitrage a powerful 
alternative measure of market efficiency. We believe that in most markets where identifiers of goods, 
traders, and locations are available, spatial arbitrage could be identified easily. We hope that future 
scholars in information systems, finance, and economics will use spatial arbitrage as a valid measure of 




In the second essay, we confirm theoretical predictions pertaining to factors stated in the limits of 
arbitrage stream of literature and the adaptive markets hypothesis. The adaptive markets hypothesis 
(AMH) stream of literature is an upcoming stream of literature in behavioral finance, which tries to bridge 
theory concerning the limits to arbitrage and theory about the efficient markets hypothesis. The AMH 
uses the evolutionary framework to explain limitations to arbitrage. We believe that using the context of 
automobile markets, we have successfully been able to test predictions relating to the existence of 
subgroups based on specific patterns of behavior. We are also able to show that behaviors change in 
response to both environmental factors and biases exhibited by arbitrageurs. 
We study how arbitrageur specialization on two dimensions namely asset type and sourcing locations 
affect arbitrage profits. We categorize arbitrageurs into different groups based on various types of 
specialization behaviors. We model the arbitrage outcomes as a system of equations and try to understand 
how arbitrageur specialization affects the outcomes of arbitrage profits and arbitrage intensity, and vice-
versa. These findings are important in light of the behavioral theory of finance, since they confirm certain 
long-held beliefs about arbitrageurs.  
We believe that this dissertation based on spatial arbitrage will help researchers in information 
systems, economics and finance by providing a better understanding of the mechanisms behind spatial 
arbitrage and arbitrageur behavior. We believe that our contributions which include using spatial arbitrage 
as a measure of market efficiency and our understanding of arbitrageur evolution in the context of the 






Appendix A: For Chapter 2 - Procedures for estimating the transport cost between facilities  
The intermediary that provided the data offers a transportation service by which a buyer can have 
vehicles transported from the intermediary’s facilities to his location. Buyers used this service for 
approximately 35% of the purchased vehicles in our data. For those vehicles, our data contain the 
transport fee (TransportFee) between the facility and the buyer’s location (which we know at the zip code 
level). We used these facility-to-buyer transport costs to estimate facility-to-facility transport costs. As 
our estimate of the transport cost between facilities k and l on day t, we used the mean of TransportFee 
for vehicles transported between facility k and buyer locations within x miles (based on zip code) of 
facility l – and vice versa – in month t. We set x=10 miles, and we aggregated to the month level to 
increase the stability of our estimates. In some cases, this did not yield an estimated transport cost 
between facilities k and l in month t due to lack of observations. We filled in these gaps by first increasing 
x to 30 and 50 miles and then extending the time period from month to quarter. We filled in remaining 
gaps for each facility-pair-month via linear interpolation. For example, if our transport cost estimates 
between Denver and Dallas for March, April, May, and June 2006 were null, $151, $152, and $153, we 
interpolated the missing value for March to be $150. This produced transport cost estimates for 99.85% of 




Appendix B: For Chapter 2 - Handling Potential buyer heterogeneity 
 We considered whether buyer heterogeneity might confound our conclusions about the effects of the 
webcast channel and the standalone electronic market on spatial arbitrage. We discuss each channel in 
turn. 
Potential buyer heterogeneity in the webcast channel analysis: We considered whether buyers who 
purchased in webcast enabled lanes might be different in unobservable ways from buyers who purchased 
in non-webcast enabled lanes. If they were, then this might be an alternative explanation for the negative 
effect of the webcast channel on spatial arbitrage. To explore this, we examined whether the buyers in 
webcast enabled lanes were a different set of buyers from those in non-webcast enabled lanes; this would 
be necessary for buyer unobservables to have a confounding effect. 95% of vehicles purchased from the 
physical market (by buyers participating either physically or via the webcast channel) between 2003 and 
2007 (which is the time span for this part of our analysis) were purchased by 69,172 buyers. Of these 
buyers, 95% purchased in both webcast and non-webcast enabled lanes. In other words, there is little 
evidence of a distinct set of “webcast lane buyers” whose unobserved characteristics might differ from 
those of “non-webcast lane buyers”; they are (overwhelmingly) the same buyers. 
Of course, there is one major distinction between the buyers in webcast enabled lanes and those in 
non-webcast enabled lanes: the former are more likely to be from remote locations (as per the 
RemoteBuyer analysis reported in §2.5.2.3) and are likely more numerous (as per the Price analysis 
reported in §2.5.2.3). These differences in buyers explain why the webcast channel reduces spatial 
arbitrage; i.e., they are the mechanism behind the effect, as opposed to an alternative explanation for the 
effect. As we discuss in the main text, the webcast channel extends buyers’ purchasing reach (i.e., the 
intermediate outcome), and this affects the probability that vehicles are arbitraged (i.e., the final 




conditioning on an intermediate outcome. This is not appropriate in our setting and would bias the 
treatment effect (see Rosenbaum 1984). 
To elaborate on this point, we compare our study to a hypothetical study designed to test the 
treatment effect of a drug for patients with dementia. In the dementia study, some patients receive the 
drug treatment, and some do not. In our study, some vehicles receive the webcast treatment, and some do 
not. In the dementia study, assume that the treated patients are significantly more likely to be able to 
follow a recipe compared to the non-treated patients. I.e., the drug has a treatment effect, and the likely 
mechanism for the effect is that the drug changes the composition of brain cells in the treated patients. In 
our study, the treated vehicles are significantly less likely to be arbitraged compared to the non-treated 
vehicles. I.e., the webcast channel has a treatment effect, and the likely mechanism for the effect is that 
the webcast channel changes the composition of buyers for the treated vehicles. There is no need to 
control for this type of post-treatment buyer heterogeneity in our study, just as there is no need to control 
for post-treatment “brain cell heterogeneity” in the dementia study. 
Potential buyer heterogeneity in the standalone electronic market analysis: Similar to above, we 
examined whether the buyers who purchased in the standalone electronic market were a different set of 
buyers from those who purchased in the physical market (either physically or via the webcast channel). 
Although almost all of the buyers in the standalone electronic market also purchased via the physical 
market,29 there is a large set of buyers who purchased in only the physical market. The “physical only” 
buyers differ from the “physical + electronic” buyers. On average, the latter purchase lower mileage, 
higher value vehicles, as illustrated in Figure A1. The two sets of buyers may be different on other 
dimensions as well. However, it is not clear why this heterogeneity would explain our result re: the 
                                                          
29 97% of vehicles purchased in the standalone electronic market were purchased by 21,206 buyers. Of 




standalone electronic market’s positive effect on arbitrage. Also, despite this heterogeneity, our results 
provide compelling evidence that the standalone electronic market fosters spatial arbitrage. Specifically, 
we show in §2.5.2.3 that the transaction immediacy of the standalone electronic market – which is not 
available in the physical market, either physically or via the webcast channel – enables arbitrageurs to 
identify and quickly purchase undervalued vehicles for later arbitrage. This improves arbitrageurs’ ability 
to exploit arbitrage opportunities. We believe this provides a more compelling and plausible explanation 
for the positive effect of this market on spatial arbitrage than does the possibility of unobserved buyer 
heterogeneity.   
 
 
Notes: The gray squares each represent a buyer who 
only purchased vehicles in the physical market. The 
black x’s each represent a buyer who purchased 
vehicles in the physical market and in the standalone 
electronic market. The placement of each square 
reflects the average Mileage and Valuation of the 
vehicles purchased by a buyer. The chart is based on 
a random sample of buyers; using the full sample 
makes the graph too dense to interpret. 
 
 
Figure B1: Scatter plot depicting the average Mileage and Valuation of vehicles purchased by “physical 
only” buyers (gray squares) and “physical + electronic” buyers (black x’s). 
We also implemented a robustness check to reduce the heterogeneity between the “physical only” and 
“physical + electronic” buyers in the standalone electronic market analysis. We reran the §2.5.2.2 analysis 
using only transactions for which Mileage was less than 54,411 and Valuation was greater than 
$13,420.30 (Note that Figure A1 shows that many “physical only” buyers purchased low mileage, high 
value vehicles similar to those purchased by “physical + electronic” buyers.) This eliminated “physical 
only” buyers who purchased very dissimilar vehicles from the analysis. Results are shown in Table B1 
                                                          
30 These are the mean values of Mileage and Valuation for the “physical + electronic” buyers. We used 























and are consistent with those in the main text. A related point is that by controlling for vehicle 
heterogeneity between the two markets in the matching analysis (by matching on VehicleYear, Make, 
Model, Mileage, and Valuation), we also control for unobserved buyer heterogeneity to some degree. This 
is because a used car dealer’s characteristics are often defined by the vehicles he sells (e.g., a dealer might 
specialize in selling low-mileage German vehicles, in high-mileage U.S. vehicles, etc.) By comparing 
very similar vehicles across channels, we are likely comparing similar buyer populations. As further 
evidence that buyer heterogeneity is unlikely to confound our conclusion, the Rosenbaum sensitivity test 
reported in the main text shows that even if our result is partially attributable to unobservables such as 
buyer heterogeneity, then these unobservables would have to have a large effect (Γ=1.49) to overturn our 
conclusion. Last (but not least), many studies that compare markets find valid effects even though buyers 
are heterogeneous across markets (e.g., Dewan and Hsu 2004; Koppius and Van Heck 2004, Banker et al. 
2011). For example, Dewan and Hsu (2004) compared two markets that differed in how much 
information they provided. They (validly) attributed the outcomes they observed to this information 
difference, even though buyers were heterogeneous across the two markets. 
Table B1: Treatment effect of the vehicle being purchased in the standalone electronic channel on 
whether the vehicle is later arbitraged, using the sub-sample. 
 
StandaloneElectronicMarketj (β1) 0.541 (0.159) *** 
Intercept (β0) -5.543 (0.123) *** 
N 41,073  
The dependent variable is the probability that the vehicle is later arbitraged. Model estimated via logistic 
regression. Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001). 
Results shown with α=7, where α denotes the number of days between flips used to delineate spatial arbitrage. 
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Appendix C:  For Chapter 3 - Robustness tests  












Year specific results Included 
_cons 0.0870***(0.0072) 
N 4000 
Degree Free. min 16.0000 
Chi-squared 248.7320 
Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
 













Year specific constants Included 
N 4000 
R2 0.601 
adj. R2 0.511 
F-stat 8.4815 
Degree Free. Min 16.0000 
Degree Free. R 3264.0000 
log-likelihood. 8787.0293 




















adj. R2 0.509 
F-stat 7.6721 
Degree Free. min 16.0000 
Degree Free. r 3264.0000 
log-likelihood. 8779.3970 
Chi-squared  
Standard errors in parentheses 







Appendix  D:  For Chapter 3 - Clustering Algorithms for creating groups of arbitrageurs based on 
vehicle specialization and location specialization 
We use the regression VehicleSpecializationit = α0i + β0i.(t – 2000)+ β0
’(t-2000)2 and  
LocationSpecializationit = α1i + β1i.(t – 2000) + β1
’(t-2000)2  to obtain the coefficients ( i.e α0i ,β0i, β0
’ and 
α1i ,β1, β1
’ )  for each arbitrageur i. We use the kmeans clustering algorithm to cluster groups of 
arbitrageurs based on their  i.e α0i ,β0i, β0
’. As a result, we obtain 3 groups of arbitrageurs G1,G2,G3. 
Similarly, we create 3 groups  L1,L2,L3 of arbitrageurs based on α1i ,β1, β1
’. We construct 9 groups of 
arbitrageurs such that each arbitrageur  belongs to a either G1,G2,G3 or L1,L2,L3. The 9 groups and the 
mean trends of their specialization patterns are plotted in the below figure. 
 







Table D1: Arbitrageur count by group 
group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
count 11 8 2 5 547 4 16 109 1 
I have also clustered on  6 variables namely ( i.e α0i ,β0i, β0
’ and α1i ,β1, β1
’ ) to obtain 9 groups directly.  
The main trends of VehicleSpecialization and LocationSpecialization are given in the diagram below. 
  
Figure D2: Trends showing mean Vehicle Specialization (Gini_power) and Location Specialization 
(Gini_auction) using coefficients of second order fits 
Table D2: Arbitrageur count by group. 
group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
count 346 18 131 19 36 9 134 4 6 
From the above figure D1  we see that the groups are not distributed evenly and the patterns cannot be 




Appendix E: For Chapter 3 - Comparing different measures of specialization 
The following table lists the important concentration measures we tested, and compared 
Table E1: Different specialization measures and their mathematical formulations 
Name of 
Measure 
Mathematical Formulation Trends for the 3 groups of 










Extremely sensitive to the 
count. Does not exhibit 
uniform trends of 
specialization for the high – 
low and medium intensity 
arbitrageurs. Hence it is not 
a good measure and cannot 
accurately indicate vehicle 
specialization. The ranges 
are always 0 – 1. The use of 












Shows consistent trends for 
high – medium-low intensity 
arbitrageurs, that can be used 
for determining arbitrageur 
strategy. The trends are 
uniform for both vehicle 




𝐺𝐸(−1) =  − ∑ 𝑠𝑖 log 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1   
 
Extremely sensitive to count. 
The trends are similar to the 
Gini or Theil. However the 
range is much larger. 









) ∑ ln (
𝜇
𝑠𝑖
)𝑁𝑖=1   
Similar to the above Similar to Entropy above, 
except that the sensitivity is 































This measure follows 
uniform patterns for all 3 
groups. It is robust and, 
though sensitive to Count 
can be used as an alternative 
measure to test our 
















Similar to the above Similar to the above, except 
the range is larger. 
CR3  




N.A. Is always 100 if there are 
only 3 types. Will not 
accurately indicate 
variations with respect to 
auction centers, where many 
arbitrageurs visit very few 
auction centers. Will have a 
skewed distributions if only 











Appendix F:  For Chapter 3 – Results of mixed logit simulations 
An alternative analysis for understanding factors affecting change in arbitrageur strategies  
In order to understand factors affecting change in arbitrageur strategies, we construct a strategy profile  
for each arbitrageur, during a time period t between 2003 and 2010. The strategy profile consists of a 
series of states, with each state consisting of two variables, one for each dimension of specialization 
during a particular year. These variables indicate whether the arbitrageur was a high specialist type– 
denoted by alphabet H or low specialist type denoted by the alphabet L. If the arbitrageur didn’t 
engage in arbitrage during a particular year the state would be denoted by NN for that particular year. 
We consider all values above the sample mean value of  H and all values below the mean as L along 
both dimensions i.e. VehicleSpecialization and LocationSpecialization. An example strategy profile is 
given below in table 4 below: 
 
Table F1:  Sample strategy profile of an arbitrageur 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Profile LL LH HL HH HH HH HH HH 
 
Each arbitrageur can be in one of the 5 possible states i.e. HH, HL, LH, LL or NN during a 
particular year. In order to understand factors that affect arbitrageur’s likelihood of choosing a particular 
state st  in a particular  year t given that his previous state was st-1 in year t-1, we use a mixed logit choice 
model (Train, 2009), which is a modification of the standard multinomial logit choice model. Each 
arbitrageur would choose to be in a state which maximizes his utility. The utility of each state s at time t 
to arbitrageur i is defined as follows: 
𝑈𝑖𝑠𝑡 = αis + 𝛽𝑠
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + Σt=2
10 𝛾𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + Σ𝑚=1
5   𝜎𝑖𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡   
Each term is described below in detail. See (Train, 2009)  for more details about this. The probability that 







2010 𝛾𝑠𝑡  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + Σ𝑚=1
5   𝜎𝑖𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 )
Σ𝑠=1 
𝑆 exp(αis + 𝛽𝑠
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + Σt=2004
2010 𝛾𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + Σ𝑚=1
5   𝜎𝑖𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 ) 
 
Here αis is a normally distributed random intercept which captures the utility of each state s for each 
dealer i. αis captures the unobserved preferences of each arbitrageur i across time periods. xit  is a vector 
which has variables that affect an arbitrageur’s likelihood of choosing a new state. The variables 
constituting xit are defined by: (i) pctArbitragedit  which indicates the percentage of vehicles arbitraged by 
arbitrageur i in period t. Since most arbitrageurs are also traders, this variable i.e.  pctArbitragedit 
indicates the importance accorded to arbitrage. (ii) cntTotalVehiclesit indicates the total number of Vehicle 
purchased by the arbitrageur i from the market in a given year t irrespective of the vehicle being 
arbitraged or not. (iii) pctElectronicVehiclesit denotes the total percentage of vehicles that were arbitraged 
and were sourced from electronic channels. (iv) CapitalWkit  indicates the total amount of capital 
accessible per week by the arbitrageur i during the year t. (v) totalAccessVehiclesit indicates the total 
vehicles accessible to the arbitrageur within 500 miles  and (vi) VehicleValuationit which indicates the 
mean vehicle valuations of all vehicles purchased by arbitrageur i. The variable 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is included as a 
dummy to control for seasonality and unobserved time varying factors for each of the 7 periods (i.e. 2004-
2010) of time in which we observe state transitions. The year 2003 is excluded because we do not observe 
the previous state.  Σt=2004
2010 𝛾𝑠𝑡  are values of associated  coefficients. Σ𝑚=1
5  𝜎𝑖𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑠 is included in the 
model, to account for the lack of independence amongst the error terms. The values of d0s..d4s indicates 
the corresponding states (HH, HL, LH, LL,NN) and  it is unlikely that error terms in our models are 
uncorrelated, on account of various factors such as a dealers preference for sourcing cars on electronic 
channels, or, a dealers preference for a particular location or vehicle type. This is referred to as a violation 
of the “IIA” assumption, as suggested in literature (Train 2009).We model this as a normally distributed 
random coefficient that varied across 5 corresponding states indicated by m = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. We also 




ignores dealer random effects and the violations of the IIA assumption. The results are similar and are 
displayed in Appendix F below. 
 The results of the mixed logit regressions are shown below in Table F4 and Table F5 respectively. 
Further discrete choice simulations are done by altering the 3 variables i.e pctArbitraged, 




Table F2: Results of the mixed logit regression with 5 different models pertaining to originating states.  
These states are indicated by HH, HL,LL and NN. a1 is a dummy variable set to 1 if the state of arbitrageur i 
in period t is HH and set to 0 otherwise. Similarly a2 , a3  , a4  and a5  are dummy variables set to 1 for the 
corresponding states HL, LH, LL and NN respectively. 
 
 
Previous state (t-1) HH HL LH LL NN 
 chosen chosen chosen Chosen chosen 
Mean      
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time dummies[t2004-t2010]  x 
state specific constants 
[a1..a5] 
Included Included Included Included Included 










For each simulation, variables are increased by 1 standard deviation of their 
current values, while the rest of the variables are retained at their means. All 
values are in percentage(%). 
@(t-1) @(t) pctArbitr













HH HH 20.92 21.90 -11.94 -0.18 4.40 -19.03 
HH HL - - - - - - 
HH LH -100.00 -75.00 -100.00 -50.00 -50.00 1175.00 
HH LL -95.02 -100.00 56.85 1.66 -19.50 68.46 
HL HH 21.20 161.96 -82.61 26.09 64.67 -78.26 
HL HL 49.21 -76.19 71.43 -13.76 -37.57 5.82 
HL LH - - - - - - 
HL LL -84.62 -98.72 10.90 -14.10 -30.77 83.97 
LH HH 176.64 176.64 -17.76 4.67 9.35 -27.10 
LH HL 116.67 -83.33 916.67 16.67 33.33 -33.33 
LH LH 55.88 55.88 70.59 -2.94 94.12 -82.35 
LH LL -73.38 -69.28 -20.48 -1.71 -15.02 20.14 
LL HH 180.38 113.29 -1.27 6.33 23.42 -9.49 
LL HL 0.00 0.00 0.00 200.00 0.00 200.00 
LL LH 97.73 81.82 20.45 -47.73 -75.00 56.82 
LL LL -51.65 -33.86 -1.10 1.42 -0.63 -1.89 
NN HH 91.89 83.78 20.27 -22.97 12.16 9.45 
NN HL - - - - - - 
NN LH 25 425 -100.00 -75.00 0.00 -100.00 






Observations 6795 2645 2200 4190 1750 
AIC 2477.5 1267.7 1074.7 1944.5 704.3 
BIC 2859.7 1597.0 1393.7 2299.5 1005.0 
log lik. -1182.8 -577.8 -481.4 -916.2 -297.2 
Chi-squared 484.8 112.1 59.30 237.3 126.3 
t statistics in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005) 
 




Table F4. Results of Multinomial Logit 
Previous state 1          2 3 4 5 
1      



























































































































































































































































































































































































Observations 1359 529 440 838 350 
AIC 2452.3 1249.2 1051.0 1911.5 672.7 
BIC 2655.6 1415.8 1210.4 2096.0 823.1 
log lik. -1187.1 -585.6 -486.5 -916.7 -297.3 
Chi-squared 630.2 191.3 162.0 254.3 214.1 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005 
 
 
Table F5: Result of the ASCLogit regression 
Previous state (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 











































































































































































































































































































































































































Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 6795 2645 2200 4190 1750 
AIC 2478.3 1275.2 1077.0 1937.5 697.4 
BIC 2833.1 1581.0 1373.2 2267.2 976.3 
log lik. -1187.1 -585.6 -486.5 -916.7 -297.7 
Chi-squared 215.8 120.4 106.6 164.2 110.5 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.005 
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